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The Applicability of Civil RICO to
Toxic Waste Polluters
INTRODUCTION
The hazardous waste' problem in the United States is enormous. The
private and public sectors generate more than 260 million metric tons of
hazardous waste annually, a quantity equal to more than 70 billion gallons.
2
Hazardous waste generators and management facilities are concentrated in
manufacturing industries which account for 92% of the total quantity
of toxic waste produced.3 Over half this country's toxic material is generated
by the chemical industry, which produces such materials as plastics, fertilizers,
synthetic fibers, medicines, detergents, cosmetics, pigments, paints, adhesives,
pesticides, and numerous other organic and inorganic chemicals.4 Approx-
imately 10% of all hazardous waste is produced by hospitals, schools,
universities, and federal, state, and local governments.' To date the E.P.A.
estimates it is aware of more than 18,000 potentially hazardous sites.6 Even
more disturbing are E.P.A. studies which conclude that environmentally
unsound methods have been used to dispose of 90% of this country's
hazardous waste.7
Adequate redress for injury caused by mismanagement of hazardous waste
does not result from application of current statutory and common law
theories of recovery. Victims of hazardous waste pollution theoretically have
a legal right to relief, but from a practical standpoint, they usually remain
uncompensated due to the fundamental nature of toxic injury. Tort law
developed in order to address direct and identifiable injuries to individuals.
Toxic injury, however, usually occurs years after exposure and can easily be
confused with disease prompted by natural causes. Scientific knowledge is
capable of determining how arms and legs break, but has not reached a
level where it can trace the cause of carcinogenic, mutagenic, or teratogenic
1. A hazardous waste is defined as "a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which
because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious
irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or (B) pose a substantial present or potential
hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or
disposed of, or otherwise managed." Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 103,
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1982).
2. Thomas, EPA Fights Hazardous Waste, 10 EPA J. Oct. 1984, at 4.
3. Id.
4. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. SW-826, EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM: HAZ-
ARDOUS WASTE 15 (1980).
5. Id. at 14.
6. Thomas, supra note 2, at 4.
7. EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM: HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 4, at 14.
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damage to one readily ascertainable source. The present state of the art is
such that toxicologists and other chronic injury experts are not able to pro-
vide attorneys with the legal certainty the lawyer needs to gain a successful
verdict.
Although no explicit federal cause of action exists for hazardous waste
victims, one potentially promising cause of action for these victims, un-
exploited by litigants to date, is provided by the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).8 RICO can be used by waste victims to
obtain relief from businesses engaging in improper waste disposal. Part I of
this Note examines the inapplicability of common law remedies for chemical
crime. Part II suggests that the civil provision of RICO is a flexible, federal
approach through which certain toxic injury victims can achieve adequate
relief. Part III addresses reform of the RICO statute.
I. TRADITIONAL TORT THEORY AND Toxic INJURY:
THE ILLUSION OF JUSTICE
The tremendous growth in American manufacturing industries since World
War II has created both new scientific advancements and new societal prob-
lems. Common law unfortunately has not changed to accommodate the times.
Today law and science conduct an uneasy partnership. Law demands proof,
while science provides only probabilities.9 Since hazardous waste victims rely
predominantly upon statistics and correlations to support their claims, few
recover in the fault-based context of tort. Rules which developed to com-
pensate immediate, individualized wrongs do not work when applied to toxic
injury because toxic injury fails to fit traditional tort definitions. 0
A. Victim Barriers
1. Causation
To recover civil damages under tort law, a plaintiff must establish the disputed
facts by a preponderance of the evidence. If at the conclusion of the pres-
entation of evidence it has not been proven more likely than not that the
defendant's action caused the plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff will lose and
go uncompensated." The civil standard of proof is said to correspond to a
8. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985).
9. See generally W. LOH, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1984) (dedicated
to bringing the legal and scientific disciplines towards approachment).
10. Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The
Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 576-88 (1983).
11. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 956-59 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
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subjective certainty of more than 50o7.' 2 This standard developed so that both
sides would share equally in the risk of error.'
3
Plaintiffs who believe they have been injured by toxic waste have dif-
ficulty meeting the civil burden of proof because injuries caused by toxic
waste, like cancer or genetic damage, are of indeterminate causation. 4 As
a result of the indeterminate causation of toxic injury, toxic tort plaintiffs
usually can establish only correlative rather than causal links between their
injuries and the contaminant to which they were exposed. 5
A plaintiff's evidence may show a correlation between an increase in the
occurrence of a disease in a population exposed to a toxic substance, but
such data offers little information as to the cause of the plaintiff's own
injury. Correlation studies use data drawn from naturally occurring con-
ditions with no control over either the circumstances in which the variables
operate or the circumstances acting upon the variables. Unless the statistical
increase is greater than 100%, it is more likely than not that the victim's par-
ticular injury was not caused by exposure to the defendant's con-
taminant. 16
The principal drawback of correlation studies is the difficulty, if not
12. W. LOH, supra note 9, at 521-22.
13. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
14. For example, one contaminant exposure study found: "Although there may be a notable
increase in the prevalence of subjective neurologic symptoms ... or of peripheral nerve symp-
toms . . . they are so frequent in control subjects that they are of little significance....
[C]onception seems to be possible even in cases of overt poisoning." (emphasis added) Reggiani
& Bruppacher, Symptoms, Signs and Findings in Humans Exposed to PCBs and their Deriv-
atives, 60 ENVmL. HEALTH PERSP. 225, 230 (1985).
15. Note, supra note 10, at 583.
16. Id. at 584. The optimal research design is the controlled experiment by which all variables
are controlled except for the one desired to be measured, i.e., contaminant exposure. Whatever
result emerges, i.e., cancer, can then be attributed with confidence to the manipulated feature.
Moral and ethical considerations prevent controlled toxic contamination experiments from being
designed for humans. W. LOH, supra note 9, at 149. Thus, scientists can only study causation
of toxic injury through human correlation studies. Most toxic waste contaminant studies reported
in the literature have been characterized by one or more of the following shortcomings:
1. small study populations;
2. lack of accurate exposure data;
3. simultaneous exposure of workers to other potentially harmful chemicals; and
4. lack of control for confounding variables such as alcohol consumption or
smoking patterns.
See Letz, The Toxicology of PCBs-An Overview for Clinicians, 138 W.J. MED. 534, 536
(1983). Researchers can design controlled experiments for animals, most notably rats. Short-
comings, however, occur because of the choice of control subject. Since rats are not human,
animal-to-man extrapolations must be made. Perhaps there is something unique about the rat's
mammalian structure that makes it more prone to certain types of cancer than man. Cancer
affects different animals in different ways. For example, the dioxin LD50-lethal dose for 500
of the population-for guinea pigs is .6 micrograms per kilogram while the dioxin LD50 for
hamsters is 500 micrograms per kilogram. This means hamsters are 10,000 times more suscepti-
ble to dioxin poisoning than guinea pigs, yet both are mammals. Environmental chemistry lecture
by Dr. Ronald Hites, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana (Oct. 30, 1985).
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impossibility, of specifying causal relationships with any reasonable cer-
tainty.1 7 The finding that cancer incidence rises with an increase in contam-
inant exposure'8 may be a spurious rather than a true relationship, given the
possibility of confounding effects of uncontrolled outside variables.' 9 One
cancer study concluded: "there is too little epidemiological evidence available
yet to evaluate the potential of PCBs as human carcinogens ... two liver
cancers and two lung cancers were reported but smoking and drinking
patterns were not available." ' 20 Toxic injury is subject to chicken-and-egg
problems of interpretation: toxic contaminants may cause injury, but the
genetic or nutritional background of the individual may cause the same
injury absent exposure to the contaminant. 2' Given the widespread dissem-
ination of carcinogenic material in the environment, it is nearly impossible
for researchers to isolate the effects of one carcinogenic agent alone. The
causal agents of toxic injuries are, therefore, often difficult if not impossible
to determine.
An additional causation problem deals with who has been injured rather
than how a particular chronic injury occurred. Recent products liability cases
illustrate that if a judge must choose between a plaintiff and a group of
manufacturers in the same market, of which one unknown manufacturer
injured the plaintiff, the manufacturers as a group will be jointly and
severally liable to the plaintiff. 22 This type of situation involves indeterminate
defendants. In toxic tort cases, however, the plaintiffs are indeterminate. 23
It may be known that a group of people has a certain type of cancer and
that a portion of them developed the cancer from exposure to the defendant's
waste, but it will not be known which victims within the overall group the
defendant specifically injured. 2 This is because correlative epidemiological
human studies and controlled animal studies typically are incapable of pro-
viding the requisite causation needed to meet the plaintiff's burden of proof.
Shifting proof of causation to the defendant, however, does not serve prin-
ciples of fairness. Carelessly shifting proof of causation to the defendant
17. W. Lost, supra note 9, at 149.
18. Some scientists believe that PCBs, which are highly toxic chemicals, may not actually
initiate cancer but that they may act synergetically with other compounds, which are in the
body or which are introduced into the body, to cause cancer. In PCB waste exposure cases,
it could be argued that it is not more likely than not that the PCB exposure alone caused the
victim's injury. See generally Perham, Legacy of Poisons, 4 EPA J. July-Aug. 1979, at 4
(dioxin exposure can cause chloracne in skin, but so can certain plant allergies).
19. W. Lost, supra note 9, at 153 (discusses causation difficulties in context of racial
discrimination cases).
20. Letz, supra note 16, at 538 (emphasis added).
21. Note, In Search of Adequate Compensation for Toxic Waste Injuries: Who and How
to Sue, 12 PEPPERIINE L. REv. 609, 618-20 (1985).
22. For a thorough analysis of the "indeterminate plaintiff" concept, see Note, supra note
10, at 582-83; Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for Indeterminate
Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 881, 881-83 (1982).
23. Note, supra note 10, at 582.
24. Id. at 581-83.
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would result in industries producing toxic waste being strictly liable for
damage claims from the large percentage of the population which will develop
cancer. Strict liability would result because no defendant could refute a
plaintiff's claim that exposure to the defendant's waste promoted the plain-
tiff's cancer.
2s
2. Statutes of Limitation
The statute of limitations for a tort action traditionally begins when a
defendant commits a tortious act. The nature of toxic injury makes it unlikely
that the toxic injury will manifest and be discovered before the expiration
of the statutory period. Although leaking dumps may produce enormous
quantities of leachate, contamination takes years to produce harm because
groundwater which serves as the migration path for toxic leachate moves
very slowly through soil.26 Large distances, however, are traversed by toxic
waste and much land area is affected with time.27 The Environmental Pro-
tection Agency Office of Solid Waste estimates that an average land disposal
site, 17 acres in size, with an annual infiltration of 10 inches of water, can
produce 4.6 million gallons of leachate yearly, and can maintain this pro-
ductivity for 50 to 100 years. 28 Contaminants from leaking dumpsites have
even been found 50 miles away. 29 Furthermore, once there is contaminant
exposure, most toxic injuries are chronic by nature, occur slowly over a
victim's lifetime and are unobservable. Unlike acute effects, such as death
or bleeding, chronic effects are characterized by long latency periods. An
individual exposed to a toxic carcinogen as a child may fail to develop cancer
for twenty or thirty years." Statutes of limitation designed to further justice
in cases involving acute injury create injustice when applied to cases involving
chronic injury.'
25. Stranahan, Toxic Torts: Compensating Victims of Hazardous Substances, 4 ALICIA
PATTERSON FOUND. REP. 19-22 (Summer 1983).
26. See, e.g., Note, supra note 10, at 580 n.21 (quotes the Council on Environmental Quality
as stating that groundwater moves at a rate of a few tens of feet per year). No matter how
much toxic waste leaches into an aquifer, it will still take years for the substance to reach
nearby wells or farmland. Consequently, waste leaching does not translate into immediate
exposure problems. See also 1. TINSLEY, CHEMICAL CONCEPTS IN POLLUTANT BEHAVIOR 232-36
(1979) (general discussion of disposal of waste chemicals in landfills).
27. A. BLOCK & F. SCARPITTI, POISONING FOR PROFIT: THE MAFIA AND Toxic WASTE IN
AMERICA 52-53 (1985) (toxic contamination may not be discovered for many years but it will
nonetheless travel considerable distances).
28. Id. at 53-54 (quoting a hazardous waste expert).
29. Id. at 53. Once groundwater becomes contaminated, rehabilitation is almost impossible.
Chemicals get trapped in rock formations and stay in the same location for years, never
decomposing or evaporating. One government report speculates that aquifers may hold con-
taminants for thousands of years, during which time they will continually spoil all groundwater
which flows through the area. Id.
30. See, e.g., Letz, supra note 16, at 538-39. See generally S. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF
CANCER (1978) (excellent overview on cancer mechanisms and cancer causation).
31. See Note, supra note 21, at 620-22.
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A recent trend within a few states has been to alter the date from which
toxic tort causes of action commence. Some jurisdictions have adopted "dis-
covery" rules in which tolling of the statute of limitations begins when
a plaintiff discovers his injury and its possible causal connection to chemical
exposure. 2 Other states, including Indiana, have created discovery rules
which toll the statute of limitations from the date the plaintiff knew or
should have discovered that he or she suffered an injury or impairment,
and that the injury was caused by the product or act of another.33 This type
of discovery rule incorporates a reasonable person standard. A different
modification followed by still other states would commence toxic tort causes
of action from the time the plaintiff knew or should have known of the
injury, its cause, and the cause of action. 4 Some states have yet to adopt
a discovery rule.
Discovery rule modifications to traditional statutes of limitation do not
ultimately solve the limitations problem. These modifications emerge from
case law rather than statutes.3" Many courts undoubtedly will limit their adoption
of a discovery rule to the precise factual pattern of the case meriting the modifi-
cation. This means that plaintiffs will have to continue to litigate the limitations
problem in order to try to extend the state's discovery rule to their own particular
factual context. Thus, even under common law that has been modified to
respond to the latency periods of chronic injury, plaintiffs will continue to
encounter unfair barriers when commencing claims for toxic injury relief.
B. Victim Proposals
Some members of Congress have pushed for legislation which would
compensate individuals suffering from hazardous waste injuries.3 Most of
the proposals would have either altered common law rules of liability and
removed existing barriers to toxic tort litigation or implemented administra-
tive compensation funds. Victim compensation proposals, however, consistently
have been defeated. 37
32. Note, supra note 10, at 581 n.23.
33. See, e.g., Barnes v. A. H. Robins Co., 476 N.E.2d 84 (Ind. 1985).
34. Note, supra note 10, at 581 n.23.
35. Recently, Congress amended the CERCLA statute to impose a federal discovery rule
upon all state statutes of limitations for hazardous substances cases. See § 203 Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act (1986). Although Congress attempted to resolve part of the in-
adequacy of the common law for addressing latent injury, it should have instead created a federal
cause of action and discovery rule for toxic injury victims rather than intrude upon each state's
choice of common law. The fate of the CERCLA amendments is uncertain because the amendments
are sure to be heavily contested by defendants on constitutional federalism grounds. See Garcia
v. San Antoino Metro Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. (1985) (5-4 decision).
36. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 311 (E. Patterson ed. 1984); Davis, Liability
Issues Remain Unsolved: 'Superfund' Bill Ready for Action by Senate, 43 CoNG. WEEKLY REP.
1150 (June 15, 1985); Note, Remedies for Hazardous Waste Injuries, II N. KY. L. REV. 435,
442 (1984); and Note, supra note 10, at 588-91.
37. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC, supra note 36, at 311 (observes that
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Opposition to toxic victim compensation has emerged in a variety of
ways. The most vocal resistance has come from the powerful chemical,
oil, and insurance industries. 38 Under Superfund,39 which provides for
the cleanup of hazardous waste dumpsites and chemical spills, chemical
companies pay a tax on their products and they steadfastly oppose imposition
of another tax to support waste victim funds. The insurance industry is
allied with the chemical industry against waste victim legislation. Both suffer
tremendously from present environmental statutory constraints. Insurance
carriers which issue general liability coverage to the toxic waste industry are
fearful that hazardous waste victim legislation would drive them into bank-
ruptcy. The chemical companies fear that such legislation would burden
them not only with more taxes but would prevent them from obtaining
insurance.
Private interest groups oppose hazardous waste victim compensation as
well as many parts of the federal government. Some bureaucrats and leg-
islators believe toxic victim compensation is too costly or unwieldy. Others
feel that toxic victim compensation is better considered in the context of a
national program for health care and health insurance. Citizens currently do
not have a specific statutory right to sue in federal courts for injuries received
in toxic waste incidents and no victim administrative funds exist.4 0 If the past
is any indication of the future, waste victims will have to continue to rely
upon inaequate common law for redress of toxic injury.
II. Crvi RICO
One method by which plaintiffs suffering from toxic injury can try to
avoid the inadequacy of common law theories of recovery and still sue dumpers,
haulers, and generators of toxic waste is through the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).4' Although RICO section 1964(c) has gen-
House consistently defeats toxic victim compensation proposals); Davis, supra note 36, at 1150(observes that Senate consistently defeats toxic victim compensation bills).
38. See Victim Compensation Plans Criticized by Insurance Industry, Said 'Uninsurable,'
14 Env't Rep. (BNA) 523-24 (July 29, 1983); See also Chemical Industry Ultimately Will
Request Victim Compensation System, Florio Predicts, 15 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 575-76 (August
8, 1984).
39. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1980 & Supp. 11 1984).
40. See Note, supra note 10 (proposes a model compensation scheme for toxic tort victims).
41. For additional commentary on RICO, consult the following: Batista, The Uses and
Misuses of RICO in Civil Litigation: A Guide for Plaintiffs and Defendants, 8 DEL. J. CoRp.
L. 181 (1983); Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v.
Berg, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 237 (1982); Campbell, Civil RICO Actions in Commercial
Litigation: Racketeer or Businessman?, 36 Sw. L.J. 925 (1982); Patton, Civil RICO: Statutory
and Implied Elements of the Treble Damage Remedy, 14 TEx. TECH. L. RE. 377 (1983);
Straffer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: Everybody's Darling, 19 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 655 (1982); and Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL
L. REV. 167 (1980).
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eraged widespread commentary from courts and legal scholars concerning the
unique opportunities of its private treble damages provision, the ramifications
of RICO on polluters who infiltrate legitimate businesses for illegal profit have
never been fully explored. A civil RICO action requires a violation of both 18
U.S.C. § 1962 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964. Section 1962, in relevant part, provides
that it is unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity
to directly or indirectly invest in, acquire or maintain any interest or control
in, or to participate in, the conduct of any enterprise which engages in
interstate commerce. 42 Section 1964(c) gives a private treble damage action
to any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962.
4
1
Civil RICO offers two potential advantages to victims of illegal toxic waste
disposal. First, by avoiding tort theory, hazardous waste victims will not en-
counter the difficulty, if not impossibility, of showing that the illegal dump-
ing of hazardous waste was the proximate cause of their latent injury." Second,
the latency periods associated with toxic injury, which might bar some waste
victims' claims in some state courts, will never bar any waste victim's federal
RICO claim.4 5 The federal statute, however, is not an ideal solution that has
been ignored for the last sixteen years. Civil RICO applies only to those hazard-
ous waste victims who can ultimately prove racketeering activity as well as
injury to business or property. These statutory limitations are not as restric-
tive as they first seem. Illegal activity by dumpers, haulers, and generators
is evidenced by EPA estimates that only 10 percent of the total hazardous
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection
of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within
the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest directly
or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce....
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity
or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions
of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides: "Any person injured in his business or property by reason
of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee."
44. See infra note 124 and notes 183-92 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
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waste in the United States has been disposed of legally and safely." In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court, in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., recently in-
validated many of the limitations on RICO lawsuits set by lower courts. 7
Civil RICO is a powerful tool for toxic waste victims, and it remains
unused by plaintiff lawyers in the toxic tort context. Since federal victims'
compensation has yet to emerge, toxic waste victims need to be aware of
all potential routes to compensation.
A. Effect of "Person" on Standards of Liability in Section 1962
One of the most heavily litigated elements of RICO is the "person"
requirement. Only a "person" who is involved with racketeering activity
may be liable under the racketeering law. Hazardous waste victims should
name a corporation as the defendant "person" rather than an individual.
This allows the RICO plaintiff to take advantage of the corporate deep
pocket and to avoid forcing individual defendants into bankruptcy. Normally
this presents no problem. When only one corporation, however, is involved
in illegal waste disposal, the waste victim will want the corporation to qualify
both as the "person" and the "enterprise," another section 1962(c) require-
ment. 41 If the waste victim is prohibited from identifying the corporation as
both a "person" and an "enterprise" in pleading her case, then the victim
will fall to state an adequate claim for RICO relief.
A corporation fulfills the requirements of both "person" and "enterprise"
under section 1961. Section 1961(3) defines a "person" as including "any
individual or entity capable of holding.a legal or beneficial interest in prop-
erty."' ' 9 An "enterprise" includes "any individual, partnership, corporation, as-
sociation or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity."' 50 RICO is silent as to whether the two
terms are mutually exclusive. A corporation clearly satisfies the "enterprise"
requirement and clearly satisfies the "person" requirement. The issue split-
ting the courts is whether the same corporation can be both a "person" and an
"enterprise" simultaneously.
1. Section 1962(a)
Section 1962(a)" states in relevant part that it is unlawful for any "person"
who has directly or indirectly derived income from a pattern of racketeering
activity to use or invest such income in the establishment or operation of
46. EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM: HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 4, at 15.
47. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
48. See supra note 42.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1984).
50. Id. § 1961(4).
51. See supra note 42.
19871
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
an enterprise affecting interstate commerce. No language within subsection (a)
indicates whether "person" and "enterprise" must be kept distinct, or whether
they may be the same entity.
A recent Seventh Circuit opinion indicates support for the enterprise-as-
person concept under section 1962(a). In Haroco v. American Nat. B. & T.
Co. of Chicago, the court in dictum observed that a corporation may be
both the liable "person" and the "enterprise" under subsection (a) if the
corporation received money from the alleged racketeering activity and if it
also could be liable as a principal for those acts. 2" The goal of RICO in reaching
those who profit from racketeering53 is realized by allowing the same cor-
poration to serve as both defendant and "enterprise" because the corporation
can be a "person" under subsection (a) only if it plays an active role as an
initiator or beneficiary of racketeering. Treble damages cannot be assessed
against a corporation "enterprise" under section 1962(a) unless corrupt
corporate employees, officers, or agents "directly" or "indirectly" use illegal
income in the company's "operation" or "establishment." 54 A corporation
"enterprise" therefore cannot be given enhanced sanctions under subsection
(a) unless the corporation in some way benefits from racketeering activity.
Several courts attempt to restrict the scope of section 1962(a). In Krediet-
bank, N. V. v. Morris, 11 the court rejected the Haroco court's reasoning
that the "person" can be the same individual or entity as the "enterprise"
under section 1962(a). In fact, the court ruled that the language in each subsec-
tion of section 1962 requires that the "person" never be the same as the
"enterprise." The court's holding, however, is based on a superficial
analysis of the language in section 1962. The court held: "the consistent
use of the words 'person' and 'enterprise' in the statute represents an
intention to distinguish between those actors throughout the statute. 6
The court failed to recognize that section 1961 of RICO defines a corporation
as both a "person" and an "enterprise" and that the enterprise-as-person
52. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985) (per
curiam). In Masi v. Ford City Bank & Trust Co., 779 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1985), the court
adopted the Haroco dictum by ruling that a corporation can serve as both a "person" and an
"enterprise" under section 1962(a). See also Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston,
793 F.2d 28 (lst Cir. 1986) (court, in dicta, observed that the "person" and "enterprise" elements
of section 1962(a) are not mutually exclusive).
53. According to the legislative history of RICO, RICO is designed to prevent the infiltration
of legitimate businesses by racketeering activity. Congress wanted to reach both "legitimate"
and "illegitmate" enterprises. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87 (1981). As
will be seen, the careful and different ways in which Congress worded each subsection of section
1962 guarantee that innocent corporation "enterprises" will not be subject to RICO liability. Those
corporation "enterprises" which benefit from racketeering activity, however, will be liable. Because
of these statutory consequences, laundering of illegally-obtained money into "respectable" busi-
nesses is effectively deterred. If money which was derived from racketeering and funneled into
a business could not be retrieved, RICO would be ineffective as a tool against crime.
54. See supra note 42.
55. No. 84-1903 slip op. (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 1985) (Laxls, Genfed library, Dist. File).
56. Id.
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concept must be analyzed with reference to the standards of liability outlined
in each subsection.
Once the two failures in Kredietbank are accounted for, as seen in Haroco,
there is no statutory requirement that a plaintiff plead a distinct "person" and
"enterprise." In fact, if plaintiffs are not allowed to plead under section 1962(a)
that a corporation "enterprise" is also a "person" then a single corporation
who perpetrates racketeering activity and who funnels illegal funds into its
business will go untouched. The Haroco ruling that a corporation may be
both the "person" and the "enterprise" under section 1962(a) is the only
correct reading of that subsection.
2. Section 1962(c)
a. "Person's" Employment by or Association With an "Enterprise"
Section 1962(c) is worded much differently than section 1962(a).5 7 In order
to invoke liability under subsection (c), a hazardous waste victim must
establish that a "person" was employed by or associated with an "enter-
prise." This wording limits the expansive "person" definition in section
1961(4)1" and illustrates that Congress meant for "person" and "enterprise"
to be mutually exclusive under subsection (c).59 If the corporation "enter-
57. See supra note 42, where section 1962(c) is cited in full. This Note does not discuss the
enterprise-as-person concept under section 1926(b) because subsection (b) is inapplicable to
racketeering acts which are grounded in an environmental context. Hazardous waste victims
will never be able to use subsection (b) to sue toxic waste polluters because the racketeering
activity prohibited by this subsection will never result in toxic injury to business or property.
Section 1962(b) essentially forbids the takeover of an "enterprise" through illegal means. See
supra note 42, where section 1962(b) is cited in full. For a discussion of the enterprise-as-person
concept regarding section 1962(b), compare Commonwealth of Pa. v. Derry Construction Co.,
617 F. Supp. 940 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (no distinct pleading of "person" and "enterprise" required
under section 1962(b)) with Medallion TV Enter. v. SelecTV of California, 627 F. Supp. 1290,
1294-95 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (distinct pleading of "person" and "enterprise" required under section
1962(b)).
58. Section 1961(4) permits a corporation to be the liable "person" under section 1962(a)-
(c).
59. Most courts do not permit a corporate entity to be simultaneously both the "person"
and the "enterprise" under subsection (c). See Bennett v. United States Trust Co. of New
York, 770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 800 (1986) (lists the Second,
Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit as all rejecting the enterprise-as-person
concept under section 1962(c)). Since Bennett, the First Circuit, in Schofield, also ruled that
both the "person" and the "enterprise" must be distinct under subsection (c).
One court, however, has carried section 1962(c)'s distinctness requirement too far. In
Medallion, the court refused to allow even a corporation "enterprise's" individual officers,
employees, or agents to be the culpable "persons" under subsection (c). Since a corporation
can not operate except through its officers, employees, and agents, the court reasoned that no
one within the corporation "enterprise" could be a "person" for purposes of subsection (c)
liability. In other words, officers, employees, and agents are not distinct from the corporation
with which they associate. Id. at 1294-95.
Apparently, the Medallion court has forgotten about the significance of that legal fiction
known as corporate identity. Once a group entity becomes incorporated, the group entity
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prise" is allowed to be the "person" under subsection (c), then the cor-
poration will incur treble liability even when its role in racketeering is passive
rather than active. For instance, unless the "person" and "enterprise"
elements under section 1962(c) are distinctly pleaded, a corporation can be
punished for being either the injured target of an agent's racketeering or
the vehicle by which an agent engages in racketeering for personal benefit.
All statutory language aside, the goals of RICO are not furthered by placing
treble damage liability on a corporation victimized by illegal conduct.6
In addition, the liberal construction clause of RICO6 does not apply to sec-
tion 1962(c) because no statutory ambiguity exists.62 Construing the subsection's
words to permit the enterprise-as-person concept allows innocent corporations
to be victimized four times-once by racketeering and three times by damages.
Neither liberal nor strict construction is required when the words of sub-
section (c) are clear.63
Some courts strain the language of section 1962(c) in order to hold that
"person" and "enterprise" need not be distinctly pleaded. The Eleventh
Circuit, in United States v. Hartley, allowed a corporation to be an "en-
terprise" and permitted an association "in fact" composed of the corporation
and its agents to be the liable "person." 64 By viewing a corporation as two
different entities in order to meet the requirements of subsection (c), the
court reasoned that the "enterprise" element would remain an important
statutory component. 6 The Hartley court's decision to permit an association
"in fact" to be a "person" under subsection (c) directly contradicts the
becomes more than the sum of its parts. A corporation exists as a distinct entity which is
separate from its members; a corporation can in its own name buy and dispose of property
and sue and be sued. One of the best illustrations of a corporation's separate identity is the
fact that it is a taxable entity, subject to a corporate income tax and a Superfund tax. In
addition, a corporation's officers, employees, and agents are not liable for the debts of the
corporation either. See generally W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES, 97-106, 172 (2d. ed. 1986) (analyzes the corporation
as a fictional entity). Since a corporation has an existence separate and apart from that of
its officers, employees, and agents, the Medallion court erred in not allowing a corporation
"enterprises's" officers, employees, and agents to be "persons" under section 1964(c).
60. See supra note 53 for a discussion concerning the policy goals of RICO as evidenced
by the statute's legislative history. See also Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc.,
615 F. Supp. 828, 835 (D.C. Ill. 1985) (without relying on any theories of statutory construction,
the court refused to allow a corporation "enterprise" to be a RICO "person" under subsection
(c) because the corporation was the victim of fraud).
61. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947.
62. See Note, supra note 41, at 169-75, 185 n.60 (the liberal construction clause in RICO
should apply only when a court has found an ambiguity in the statute).
63. Id. at 191 (the author concludes: "In the final analysis, the construction of RICO ....
reduces to a commonsense reading of the statute. The words of the statute-the culmination
of the legislative process-deserve the utmost deference.").
64. 678 F.2d 961, 989-90 (1982).
65. Id.
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requirement in section 1961(3) that a liable "person" be able to hold a
property interest. Associations "in fact" cannot hold legal or beneficial
interests because they are not recognized by the law as legal entities.6
A legal person or entity is a person or entity which the law recognizes as
possessing rights as a distinct unit.67 The law treats some groups as legal
entities, such as corporations. Unlike an association "in fact," for example,
corporations contractually organize. Associations "in fact" have no legal iden-
tity because they are not bound by any legal relationship.68 In an association
"in fact" only the individuals within the association can maintain ownership
interests in property. Since associations "in fact" do not satisfy section 1961(4),
and the wording of section 1962(c) requires a "person"-"enterprise" distinc-
tion, a corporation which is the victim or vehicle of racketeering by its of-
ficers, employees, or agents will not be subject to RICO liability under sec-
tion 1962(c). Section 1962(c), as well as section 1962(a), exposes only those
corporations or individuals who benefit from racketeering to treble damage
liability.
b. Respondeat Superior
Under section 1962(c), some RICO plaintiffs plead individual defendants
as "persons" and a corporation as the "enterprise" and then try to hold
the corporation "enterprise" liable under state law agency principles. 69 These
plaintiffs rely upon the state law theory of respondeat superior, which holds
a principal civilly liable for any wrongful conduct committed by the prin-
cipal's agents in the course of their employment. 70 The federal courts are
sharply divided over whether state-created agency principles can be used to
impose civil liability upon corporation "enterprises" under section 1962(c), 7'
66. In State v. Sunbeam Rebekah Lodge, 169 Ore. 253, 127 P.2d 726 (1942), a fraternal
organization's inability to take title prevented the organization from inheriting a deed. The
devise to the unincorporated association escheated to the state.
67. See Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401 ("[Tlhe nebulous association in fact does not itself fall
within the RICO definition of 'person.' We doubt that an 'association in fact' can, as such,
hold any interest in property or even be brought into court. In the association in fact situation,
each participant in the enterprise may be a 'person' liable under RICO, but the association
itself cannot be."). See generally J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 16-29 (1968)
(discusses legal recognition of group entities).
68. See supra note 59 for a discussion concerning corporate identity.
69. See, e.g., Schofield, 793 F.2d at 32; Inryco, 615 F. Supp. at 835; Bernstein v. IDT
Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (D. Del. 1984).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 261, comment a (1957).
71. Compare Schofield, 793 F.2d at 32-34 (respondeat superior does not apply to section
1962(c)) with Bernstein, 582 F. Supp. at 1083-84 (respondeat superior does apply to section
1962(c)) and Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Mass. 1986) (recognizes that general
agency principles may be used by RICO plaintiffs to impute liability to a corporation "enter-
prise").
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but no federal court yet realizes that it does not possess federal question
jurisdiction to hear the agency claim. Because Congress excluded "enter-
prises" from being "persons" liable under section 1962(c),72 federal courts
do not have an independent basis of statutory jurisdiction over state law
claims against a subsection (c) "enterprise" unless diversity of citizenship is
present. In addition, federal courts may not exercise pendent jurisdiction
over state law claims against a subsection (c) "enterprise" either.
Under the theory of pendent jurisdiction, a federal court possessing ju-
risdiction over a federal claim may also have jurisdiction over a state claim
if the two claims both derive from a "common nucleus of operative fact"
and normally would be expected to be adjudicated in one judicial pro-
ceeding. 73 In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, the Supreme Court held that,
as a matter of constitutional power, federal courts can exercise pendent
jurisdiction if "the relationship between [the federal claim] and the state
claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises
but one constitutional 'case.' ''74 Under Gibbs, as long as state and federal
claims arise out of a "common nucleus of operative fact," only one Article
III "case" exists. The Court has not determined whether one Article III
"case" exists when a plaintiff asserts pendent jurisdiction over a state-created
claim against a completely new party who is not involved in the federal
claim," but the Court has ruled that a new party may not be brought in
under pendent jurisdiction to respond to a state claim if such joinder violates
the congressional intent underlying the federal grant of jurisdiction. 76
In Aldinger v. Howard,77 the Supreme Court held that for pendent juris-
diction to exist, a federal court must satisfy itself that, first, Congress
extended, explicitly or implicitly, federal jurisdiction over a party or claim
and, second, that all parties or claims constitute only one Article III "case."
The plaintiff in Aldinger brought suit against an individual as well as a
county under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and alleged
that she was wrongfully discharged from employment. Jurisdiction over the
federal civil rights claim was asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), which gives
federal district courts jurisdiction over section 1983 civil rights claims, and
pendent jurisdiction was asserted to lie over the state-created respondeat
superior claim against the county. The Court observed that the language in
section 1983 excluded counties from ever being "persons" answerable to the
72. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
73. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
74. Id. Article III provides that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, with
jurisdiction extending only to diversity of citizenship and "cases" arising under the laws drafted
by Congress. The Court's decision in Gibbs illustrates that the outer limits of a federal court's
power are determined by how broadly an Article III "case" is to be defined.
75. This variation of traditional pendent jurisdiction is known as pendent party jurisdiction.
76. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
77. Id. at 17-19.
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plaintiff.78 Thus, no independent basis of federal jurisdiction existed over
the county and consequently the Court ruled that the district court lacked
power to extend pendent jurisdiction over the state claim against the county,
who was not a party involved in the federal claim. 79
Surprisingly, every RICO plaintiff, RICO defendant, and federal court to
this author's knowledge has assumed that jurisdiction exists for federal courts
to adjudicate a state-created respondeat superior claim against an "enter-
prise" in conjunction with a federally-created section 1962(c) RICO claim
against an "enterprise's" employees. In Schofield v. First Commodity Corp.
of Boston, for example, a RICO plaintiff brought suit against commodity
brokers under section 1962(c) claiming she was fraudulently induced to invest
all her liquid assets in trading commodities futures, and she also claimed
that the "enterprise," which was the commodities firm, was liable for the
brokers' RICO violations under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 0 Ju-
risdiction over the state claim was assumed by both the district court and
the First Circuit, but the facts in Schofield present the exact same jurisdic-
tional issue present in Aldinger.
Under sections 1964(a) and (c) of RICO, the First Circuit possesses federal
question jurisdiction over the commodities brokers, but unless there is pen-
dent jurisdiction over the state-created respondeat superior claim against the
"enterprise," the commodities firm, the appellate court can not decide the
state claim. In Schofield, the First Circuit found that Congress excluded
"enterprises" from being "persons" under section 1962(c) of RICO, but
instead of following Aldinger and recognizing that it had no power to exercise
pendent jurisdiction over the respondeat superior claim against the "enter-
prise," the First Circuit heard the claim and determined that respondeat
superior could not be used to impute liability to the "enterprise." The First
Circuit should not have decided that the state-created respondeat superior
claim against the "enterprise" was improper but instead should have dis-
78. Id. at 16. The Court relied upon its decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),
for this reading of § 1983, but the Court in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658 (1978), later construed § 1983 to allow countries to be defendants.
79. Since the Court in Aldinger determined that Congress implicitly declined to extend
federal jurisdiction over the county, the Court refused to address whether pendent party
jurisdiction is constitutional under Article III. The Court noted: "But the question whetherjurisdiction over the instant lawsuit extends not only to a related state-law claim, but to the
defendant against whom that claim is made, turns initially, not on the general contours of the
language in Article III, i.e., 'Cases ... arising under,' but upon the deductions which may be
drawn from congressional statutes as to whether Congress wanted to grant this sort of juris-
diction to federal courts." Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 16-17.
80. 793 F.2d 28. In reading the First Circuit's opinion, it appears that the plaintiff only
sued First Commodity Corp. of Boston (FCCB), the commodities firm. The district court,
however, resolved any ambiguity: "plaintiff argues- and although she has not pleaded these
elements clearly- FCCB is the 'enterprise.' FCCB's brokers are the 'persons,' and, by respondeat
superior, FCCB is liable for its brokers' violations of RICO." 638 F. Supp. 4, 8 D. Mass.
1985).
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missed the state claim on the ground that joinder of an "enterprise" for
purposes of asserting a state law claim not within federal diversity jurisdiction
is outside the statutory jurisdiction of a federal court. In other words, the
First Circuit should have heard only the plaintiff's RICO claim against the
brokers and it should have left to a state court the task of determining
whether respondeat superior can be used to impute liability to a section
1962(c) "enterprise."'
State courts, however, must refuse to apply respondeat superior to a section
1962(c) "enterprise." An "enterprise" which has been excluded from RICO
liability by Congress should not be held liable under RICO merely because
the facts giving rise to RICO liability against an employee of the "enterprise"
also give rise to a state-created claim against the "enterprise." The language
in section 1962(c) plainly prohibits application of agency principles to the RICO
"enterprise." As seen earlier, the language in section 1962(c) prohibits a "per-
son" from using an "enterprise" as a vehicle for a pattern of racketeering
activity or from making an "enterprise" the target of a pattern of racketeering
activity.2 Congressional intent is contravened if a state court allows RICO
plaintiffs to use agency principles to by-pass the requirements of section
1926(c). In addition, the wording of section 1964(c), the civil suit provision,
also rejects application of respondeat superior to a corporation "enterprise."
Section 1964(c) allows victims to recover damages far in excess of actual in-
jury. Civil RICO thus authorizes damages which are clearly punitive. General
principles of agency law, however, do not condone imputing liability for
punitive damages upon a principal.8 3 Thus, when claims arise under sections
1962(c) and 1964(c), the language in both of these sections illustrates that
81. Since statutory considerations negate the existence of pendent party jurisdiction for a
respondeat superior claim against an "enterprise" under section 1962(c) of RICO, a federal
court will not have to address whether constitutional considerations also prohibit the exercise
of pendent party jurisdiction. There is however conflict among the federal courts whether it is
constitutional under Article III to exercise pendent party jurisdiction when there is no statutory
evidence that Congress is against such jurisdiction. Compare Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136,
137 (9th Cir. 1969) ("Joinder of claims, not joinder of parties, is the object of the doctrine
[of pendent jurisdiction]. It was not designed to permit a party without a federally cognizable
claim to invoke federal jurisdiction by joining a different party plaintiff asserting an independent
federal claim growing out of the same operative facts.") with Leather's Best, Inc. v. S. S.
Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 811 (2d Cir. 1971) (with regard to cases involving pendent party
jurisdiction, "the same facts are ultimately controlling with respect to both the state and federal
claims; the desirability of having both claims tried in the same forum is self-evident.") See D.
CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 219-20 (1982) for a discussion outlining the constitutional tension
surrounding pendent party jurisdiction.
82. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217(c) which provides:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal
because of an act by an agent if, but only if:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the
scope of employment, or
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respondeat superior must not be used to impute liability to the "enterprise. '8 4
In the antitrust context, the Supreme Court, in American Society of
Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp.," applied respondeat superior
theory to an innocent corporation."" Some courts and commentators"7 believe
that enough similarity exists between the private RICO remedy and the private
antitrust remedies88 for American Society to apply to civil RICO claims under
section 1962(c). American Society should never be controlling for a RICO
action premised upon section 1962(c) and respondeat superior. RICO cases
are substantially different from antitrust cases. Not all instances of racketeering
occur in commercial business contexts. RICO was deliberately drafted outside
antitrust law because antitrust law contains difficult liability and standing re-
quirements that are inappropriate for RICO purposes. 9 The language of sec-
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved
the act.
Under the Restatement of Agency, the activity of nonmanagerial employees will never subject
an employer to punitive damages. Strict application of the Restatement to civil RICO section
1964(c) would, however, permit punitive damages to be imposed upon a corporation "enterprise"
if the racketeering acts were committed by high-level employees. But the distinct "person"-
"enterprise" requirement of section 1962(c) signals congressional intent that an "enterprise"
which is an instrument or victim of racketeering must not be punished.
84. As seen supra note 52 and accompanying text, section 1962(a) contains no distinct
"person"-"enterprise" requirement, and a single corporation can serve both as an "enterprise"
and as a "person." The language of subsection (a) therefore does not prevent a RICO plaintiff
from using respondeal superior to impute liability to an "enterprise" if the plaintiff chooses
to plead the "enterprise" apart from the "person." However, agency principles only allow
punitive damages to be awarded against principals whose managerial employees act wrongfully.
See supra note 74. In order to reach the corporate deep pocket when nonmanagerial employees
commit racketeering acts, the RICO plaintiff should plead the corporation as both the "person"
and the "enterprise" under section 1962(a).
85. 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
86. As will be seen, congressional intent behind the drafting of the antitrust statutes is not
undermined by allowing a corporation to be the liable "person." See infra notes 89-91 and
accompanying text. For this reason, American Society can be distinguished from cases arising
under civil RICO. In addition, the Supreme Court failed to recognize that the facts of American
Society present the issue whether pendent party jurisdiction is constitutional under Article III.
If presented with an argument that American Society is precedent for civil RICO actions based
on section 1962(c), one should not only distinguish American Society on statutory grounds but
also argue that pendent party jurisdiction is unconstitutional. See supra note 81.
87. See, e.g., Patton, supra note 41 at 388-89. Patton gave four reasons why the private
antitrust remedy should be applicable to the private RICO remedy:
(1) both laws were designed to compensate victims;(2) the treble damages provision within each law is crucial to the encouragement
of private suits;
(3) any limitation on the private remedy sections of either law inhibits private
enforcement, intensifies agency burdens, and requires victims to shoulder losses
when the individual wrongdoer is insolvent; and
(4) Congress intended for RICO to be liberally construed.
Id. at 389. See also Bernstein, at 1083-84 (refers to American Society supporting the proposition
that respondeat superior may be applied to section 1962(c) claims).
88. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982); Sherman Antitrust Act, §§ 1,2, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1,2 (1982).
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tion 1962(c) differs markedly from that of antitrust law. As seen, the wording
of section 1962(c) illustrates that "person" and "enterprise" are to be distinct.
In American Society, the action on appeal was brought under standards of
liability in the Sherman Antitrust Act.9" The antitrust standards do not con-
tain restrictive language similar to that found within section 1962(c). 91 The
Supreme Court applied agency principles in American Society because the Sher-
man Antitrust Act does not statutorily restrain the Court from using respondeat
superior theory.
c. "Conduct . . .Through" Requirement of Section 1962(c)
Besides the enterprise-as-person concept, section 1962(c) is involved in
another controversy pertaining to its "person" element. In order for a RICO
violation to occur under section 1962(c), the "person" must either directly
or indirectly conduct or participate in the conduct of the "enterprise" through
a pattern of racketeering activity. 92 Several judges have construed the "con-
duct . . . through" language to mean that a RICO "person" is subject to
subsection (c) liability only when the plaintiff establishes that the "person"
participated in the operation or management of the "enterprise;" others have
held nonmanagerial employees to qualify as "persons" liable under RICO. 3
89. In 1969 the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law studied the question
of whether antitrust law ought to be extended as a weapon against organized crime. The Report
concluded:
By placing the antitrust-type enforcement and discovery procedures in a separate
statute, a commingling of criminal enforcement goals with the goals of regulating
competition is avoided ... [T]he use of antitrust laws themselves as a vehicle for
combating organized crime could create inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles
in the way of persons injured by organized crime who might seek treble damage
recovery. Such a private litigant would have to contend with a body of precedent-
appropriate in a purely antitrust context-setting strict requirements on questions
such as 'standing to sue' and 'proximate cause' . . . [T]he [ABA] Section of
Antitrust Law recommends that [organized crime] legislation be enacted as an
independent statute and not be included in the Sherman Act, or any other antitrust
law.
S. 1623 and S. 1624, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 6995 (1969).
90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982).
91. Under §7 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, "person" includes corporations and associations
existing by law, and §§ 1,2, the antitrust standards of liability, contain no language which
restricts the expansive definition of "person." A corporation fits within the "person" definition
of the Sherman Antitrust Act whether the corporation is a victim or a target of antitrust
violations. § 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides for a private cause of action, reads like the
Sherman Antitrust Act.
92. See supra note 42 where § 1962(c) is cited in full.
93. Compare Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008(1983) (RICO "person" must be involved in the operation of the affairs of the "enterprise");
United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1375, vacated on other grounds, 602 F.2d 653 reh'g
denied, 609 F.2d 1076, (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980) (RICO "person" must
operate or mange the "enterprise's" business); Agristor Leasing v. Meuli, 634 F. Supp. 1208,
1223-24 (D. Kan. 1986) (RICO "person" must play an active role in the management of the
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If the "person" must significantly control the "enterprise" before subsection
(c) can apply, then only corrupt, high-level officials who are located within
the "enterprise's" infrastructure can qualify as RICO defendants, and lower
level employees who engage in racketeering would be able to avoid RICO
liability.
The language in section 1962(c), however, does not require that a "per-
son's" degree of racketeering participation in the "enterprise" must be
managerial in nature. One does not have to directly conduct an "enterprise's"
affairs through a pattern of racketeering before liability can be imposed
under section 1962(c), although such activity would meet the "conduct...
through" requirement. According to the language of section 1962(c), a
"person" also violates subsection (c) whenever he or she indirectly partici-
pates in the operation of an "enterprise" through a pattern of racketeering.
This latter subsection (c) standard of liability is selectively ignored by those
courts which require a high level of participation by the "person" in the
"enterprise's" affairs. The "indirect participation" language of section 1962(c)
subjects all nonmanagerial employees of the "enterprise," as well as non-
employees who have minimum contacts with the "enterprise," to the pro-
hibitions of section 1962(c). RICO plaintiffs therefore are not required to plead
that RICO defendants occupied any role in the operation, management, or
creation of the "enterprise." The "conduct ... through" requirement would
be met if a hazardous waste victim can show that an outside environmental
consulting firm or a law firm prepared and disseminated false environmental
statements concerning a now bankrupt corporation's waste disposal practices. 94
3. Summary
The previous few pages analyzed the effect the "person" element has upon
the standards of liability in sections 1962(a) and (c). We have seen that Con-
gress' choice of words in RICO prevents a corporation from incurring treble
damage liability unless the corporation benefitted from the "person's" pat-
tern of racketeering activity. When only one corporation is involved in a pat-
tern of racketeering and it is the vehicle or target of a pattern of racketeering
by corporate insiders, the plaintiff must use section 1962(c) and can reach
only the corporate insiders' individual assets. If, however, a hazardous waste
RICO "enterprise") with Bank of Am. v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 970 (11th Cir.
1986) (word "conduct" in § 1962(c) means nothing more than performance of activities helpful
or necessary to the "enterprise's" affairs); Virden v. Graphics One, 623 F. Supp. 1417, 1428-29
(D.C. Cal. 1985) (RICO § 1962(c) does not require that the "person" participate in the opera-
tion or the management of the "enterprise").
94. See Bank of America, 782 F.2d at 970 ("The complaint alleges sufficient participation
to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion. The banks have alleged that defendants assisted in the prep-
aration and dissemination of false financial statements. These financial statements were helpful
to [the enterprise] because they allegedly induced the banks to lend money to the enterprise.").
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victim can establish that a single corporation played an active role in a pat-
tern of racketeering activity, the victim, without resorting to respondeat
superior, can reach corporate assets by using the enterprise-as-person concept
allowed by section 1962(a)." RICO waste victims should be able to establish
that the corporation "enterprise" benefitted by playing an active role in the
pattern of racketeering which injured the waste victim. Since legitimate hazard-
ous waste disposal costs thousands of dollars, it is hard to imagine any situation
in which the illegal dumping of toxic wastes by corporate officers, employees,
or agents will not directly or indirectly benefit the corporation "enterprise."
Most hazardous waste disposal scenarios will involve either a corporation il-
legally removing its own wastes or a corporation which illegally profits from
hauling or disposing the wastes of other businesses. If the victim is unable
to use section 1962(a), the preferable section, and must instead rely on sec-
tion 1962(c), the "conduct .. . through" requirement of subsection (c) at
least allows the victim to name as the liable "person" anyone whose racketeer-
ing activities involve the "enterprise."
B. Racketeering A ctivity96
1. Mail and Wire Fraud
RICO encompasses a vast array of federal and state offenses in section
196 197 but the predicate acts most relevant to toxic waste RICO litigation
95. Section 1962 also contains a subsection (d) which provides that it "shall be unlawful for any
person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
This subsection was not analyzed with subsections (a) and (c) because subsection (d) incorporates
the provisions of all the other subsections.
96. Before Sedima, 105 S. Ct. 3275, some lower courts required RICO plaintiffs to prove
that the RICO defendant was previously convicted of a prohibited activity under § 1962. In
Sedima the Supreme Court rejected a prior conviction requirement for RICO plaintiffs and
held that the list of prohibited racketeering activities in § 1961 consists not of acts for which
the defendant has been convicted, but of acts for which the defendant could be convicted. Id.
at 3283. The word "conviction" does not appear anywhere in §§ 1961, 1964(c), or 1962.
The lower court in Sedima, held that unless RICO contained a prior conviction requirement,
the plaintiff would have to establish predicate act violations beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
at 3282. It suggested that juries would be confused by the application of both criminal and
civil burdens of proof in one action. The Supreme Court was unconvinced that predicate acts
alleged under the private remedy § 1964(c) have to be established with reference to criminal
standards of liability: "[Just because] the offending conduct is described by reference to criminal
statutes does not mean that its occurrence must be established by criminal standards or that
the consequences of a finding of liability in a private civil action are identical to the consequences
of a criminal conviction." Id. at 3283. The Supreme Court did not conclusively decide the
standard of proof issue. Its strong dicta, however, suggests that private plaintiffs need establish
a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO by only a preponderance of the evidence.
97. As used in § 1961 of RICO, "racketeering activity" means:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is
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are mail fraud 9s and wire fraud29 Before relating these two federal statutes
to hazardous waste RICO litigation, a general discussion of mail and wire
fraud is warranted. Except for differences in the type of communication
chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of
title 18, United States Code: section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating
to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section
659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section
659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare
funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084
(relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2320 (relating to
mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating to
obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510
(relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to' the
obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference
with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering),
section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia),
section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating
to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating
to interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315
(relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), Section 2320 (relating to
trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346
(relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white
slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code,
section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations)
or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense
involving fraud connected with a case under title 1I, fraud in the sale of securities,
or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling,
or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any
law of the United States, or (E) any act which is indictable under the Currency
and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act.
A close reading of the different types of federal crimes which constitute racketeering activity
under section 1961 indicates that mail and wire fraud are the most likely to be committed by
persons engaged in fraudulently concealed hazardous waste disposal.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the mail fraud statute, provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give
away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit
or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to
be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in
any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives
therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail
according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be
delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall
be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1343, the wire fraud statute, provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of
wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any
writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
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used by a defendant, the mail and wire fraud statutes are identical and may
be construed together.100 An analysis of the mail fraud statute therefore is
applicable to the wire fraud statute. Requisite elements for establishing
substantive mail fraud counts are first, a scheme to defraud, and second,
the use of the mails to execute or further the scheme.'0 '
The first requirement, a scheme to defraud, connotes some degree of
planning by a perpetrator. The plaintiff consequently must establish that the
defendant acted with intent to defraud.'0 2 A materially false statement con-
tained in a document sent through the mails clearly constitutes a fraudulent
misrepresentation.' 3 A person similarly engages in false misrepresentation
when he or she assigns to an article qualities which the article does not
possess. "
In the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be used to
establish specific and actual intent to defraud." ' The scheme of defraud
element does not require that the scheme be fraudulent on its face, but the
scheme must involve some sort of fraudulent misrepresentation or omission
reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and compre-
hension.' ° The fact that no misrepresentation of any fact exists is immaterial;
it is necessary only to prove that a scheme is reasonably calculated to
deceive. 0 7 Fraudulent deception thus can occur even when the words them-
selves do not deceive. Arrangements of words or the circumstances in which
words are used may convey a false and deceptive appearance.' 8 It is also
unlawful for a defendant to print "half-truths" or to omit facts necessary
to make the statements in light of the circumstances under which they are
made not misleadingY°9
100. United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir. 1977).
101. United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977). See
also United States v. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 828 (1983);
United States v. Murr, 681 F.2d 246 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 973 (1982); United States
v. Shelton, 669 F.2d 446 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 934 (1982); Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347.
102. DeMier v. United States, 616 F.2d 366 (8th Cir. 1980).
103. United States v. Reid, 533 F.2d 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
104. United States v. New South Farm and Home Co., 241 U.S. 64 (1916). See also United
States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir. 1970) (claims or statements in
advertising may go beyond mere puffing and enter realm of fraud where product will inherently
fail to do what is claimed for it).
105. Phillips v. United States, 356 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 952
(1966). See also DeMier, 616 F.2d 366 (In mail fraud prosecution, implicit finding by jury that
defendant specifically intended to defraud was supported by substantial, direct, and circum-
stantial evidence).
106. United States v. Van Dyke, 605 F.2d 220 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 994 (1979).
107. Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968). See also Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1967) (scheme may be fraudulent
even though no affirmative misrepresentation of fact be made).
108. Gusow v. United States, 347 F.2d 755 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 906 (1965).
109. United States v. Townley, 665 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1010 (1982).
See also United States v. Curtis, 537 F.2d 1091 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 962 (1976)
(fraudulent representations may be effected by deceitful statements or half-truths or the con-
cealment of material facts).
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Reckless disregard for truth or falsity is sufficient to sustain a mail fraud
conviction. An awareness of a high probability of fraud, coupled with
shutting one's eyes to avoid learning the truth, may in some instances amount
to fraudulent intent."0 Good faith is a complete defense to an allegation of
intent to defraud, but no matter how firmly the defendant may believe in
a plan, his or her belief will not justify baseless, false, or reckless represen-
tations."
The second requirement of the mail fraud statute, the mailing element,
contains two factors to be proved. The plaintiff must, first, establish that
the defendant "caused" the use of the mails and, second, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the use was for the purpose of executing the scheme to
defraud." 2 The Mail Fraud Act, as a result, does not reach all frauds, but
only those limited instances in which the use of the mails is a part of the
execution of the fraud. One "causes" use of the mails when he or she
performs some act in which it is reasonably foreseeable that the mails will
be used.' 3 A defendant need not place any matter in the mail; the defendant
need only have a reasonable basis to foresee that his actions would result
in the use of the mails."" It is enough if the defendant knows that letters
are likely to be mailed, and the letters are in fact mailed. The next factor,
use of the mails in execution of the scheme to defraud, requires that the
mailings occur before the scheme terminates. Mailings taking place after the
scheme's objectives have been accomplished, or before the scheme has begun,
are not sufficiently related to the scheme to support mail fraud liability." 5
In United States v. Maze, the Supreme Court held that a defendant who
made unlawful purchases with a stolen credit card could not be convicted
under the Mail Fraud Act because the alleged fraud had occurred prior to
110. United States v. Schaflander, 719 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1983). See also United States v.
Themy, 624 F.2d 963 (10th Cir. 1980).
11I. Mandel, 591 at F.2d 1347. See also United States v. Dick, 744 F.2d 546, 551 (7th Cir.
1984) (reckless disregard for truth or falsity is sufficient to sustain conviction for mail fraud,
and notwithstanding defendant's claim of confusion or ignorance, mistakes and discrepancies
in written and reported telephone bids proved his knowing and intentional participation in the
scheme to defraud); United States v. Boyer, 694 F.2d 58, 59 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Reckless indif-
ference is the equivalent of intentional misrepresentation 'because you may not recklessly
represent something as true which is not true even if you don't know it if the fact you don't
know it is due to reckless conduct on your part."').
112. United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, reconsidered in part sub. nom. United States
v. Holt, 650 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 943 (1982). See also United States
v. Roylance, 690 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1982).
113. United States v. Georgalis, 631 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 636 F.2d 315
(5th Cir. 1981) There is no requirement of a "but for" relationship between use of the mails
and execution of a scheme to defraud. It is not necessary that use of the mails rather than
some other means of communication was essential, or that the scheme could not have succeeded
"but for" the mailings. United States v. Patrick Petroleum Corp. of Mich., 703 F.2d 94 (5th
Cir. 1982).
114. United States v. Otto, 742 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1984).
115. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974).
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the mailing of the credit card bills and because the mailing increased the
defendant's chances of apprehension. ' 6 The Court observed that a mailing
which increases the probability of a defendant's detection cannot be a mailing
in furtherance of a scheme to defraud."" Mailings made after the fruits of
the scheme have been received are not always outside of the proscription of
the statute.'' 8
RICO ligitants should note that the civil remedy section of RICO requires
an injury to business or property by reason of a section 1962 violation." '
Hazardous waste victims using mail or wire fraud as predicate acts therefore
must prove actual injury and a successful scheme to defraud because section
1964(c) adds these requirements.
2. Application of the Predicate Offenses of Mail
and Wire Fraud to the Toxic Waste Context
The Mail and Wire Fraud Acts are extremely helpful for establishing
racketeering activity in toxic waste cases for purposes of RICO. For years,
scientific fraud has plagued this nation; a lot of the information which the
government buys or requires from the private sector is either fraudulent or
useless. 20 Crime pays in science for two reasons. First, it is difficult to
116. Id. at 402.
117. Id. at 403.
118. Otto, 742 F.2d at 104. See also Schaflander, 719 F.2d at 1025 (evidence that defendants
made numerous misrepresentations and that they used mailings as part of the scheme to lull
investors into a false sense of security was sufficient to sustain a mail fraud conviction); United
States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 78 (1982) (lulling letters designed to postpone detection meet
the requirement that the mails be used for the purpose of executing a fraudulent scheme);
United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 537 (3d Cir. 1978) (evidence of deliberate use of
false and misleading statements in promotional statements combined with fabricated excuses
and "lulling" letters was clearly sufficient to permit, if not compel, a jury to conclude that
there was a fraudulent scheme).
119. See supra note 42 for text of § 1926 cited in full.
120. See Marshall, The Murky World of Toxicity Testing, 220 Sct. 1130 (1983) (This is an
excellent report concerning four research scientists on trial for fraud in a case that has cast
doubt on the safety of 200 marketed pesticides. An E.P.A. summary of Industrial Bio-Test
laboratories, where the alleged fraud occurred, shows that of 1205 key experiments for the
F.D.A., from which approval was given for many drugs and pesticides, only 214 experiments
were valid.) See also Pennsylvania Landfill Operator Fined, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 495 (Aug.
1, 1986) (A western Pennsylvania landfill operator pleaded guilty to four criminal charges of
illegally dumping chemical wastes. The landfill operator, who was licensed by the government,
admitted that he illegally dumped contaminated leachate into two holding tanks and then
pumped the leachate from the tanks through a piping system into a stream, which ultimately
flowed into a state park); Kentucky Oil Refiner to Pay $762,000 Fine, Agrees to Improve
Compliance Under Water Act, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 436 (July 18, 1986) (A Kentucky oil
company agreed to pay $762,500 in fines for alleged Clean Water Act violations. Among plant
conditions documented in the consent decree were discharges of toxic pollutants which were
not covered by any of the plant's dumping permits, as well as failure to follow Clean Water
Act reporting requirements.); Appeals Court Upholds $1.2 Million Fine for Company's Dis-
charge Permit Violations, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 109 (May 30, 1986) (The Fourth Circuit ruled
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expose manipulation or concealment of data. Second, businesspersons and
scientists are not stereotypical criminals. Falsification, suppression, and de-
struction of scientific data by individuals regularly occurs when profitable
products or processes, or the dumping of toxic materials, must be govern-
ment approved. 2 Scientific or chemical fraud is extremely easy to commit.
It occurs with only minor reporting fudges or shoddy use of respected
methodology or concealment of illegal hazardous waste dumpings. The hazardous
waste industry is inextricably tied to the science sector because information
about hazardous substances, ranging from toxicity to leachability, must come
from scientists. Since the cost of legitimate disposal can run thousands of
dollars per barrel of waste,' 2 the hazardous waste industry is a fertile breeding
ground for corporate fraud.
There is an economic double-incentive for businesses to engage in illegal
waste disposal. First, generators of toxic chemicals continually produce haz-
ardous substances and thus constantly face high disposal costs. Many times
it is in their economic interest to personally engage in illegitimate disposal
or to hand over toxic materials to corrupt haulers and claim ignorance of
that a Virginia pork processing plant can be fined $1,285,322 for violating its pollutant discharge
permit. The Fourth Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling which held the pork processing plant
liable for 666 violations of its pollutant discharge permit. The permit violations were due to
inadequate biological and chlorination systems, and were compounded by the plant's failure
to rapidly respond to known permit violations); Houston Refiner Faces $2.5 Million Fine for
Exceeding Gas Lead-Content Standards, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 37 (May 9, 1986) (Houston's
Gulf States Oil & Refining Co. was fined $2,573,090 by E.P.A. for allegedly exceeding allowable
levels of lead in fuels produced during 1983-1984. Moreover, two ex-officials of the company
face federal charges for criminally violating the Clean Air Act by knowingly submitting to
E.P.A. false lead additive reports); New York Fines SCA Chemical Services for Violations of
Hazardous Waste Regulations, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2242 (April. 18, 1986) (SCA Chemical
Services Inc. was fined S105,000 by New York state for violating its permits' monitoring,
reporting, and dumping requirements); Water Company Fined $600,000 for Dumping Acids,
Paint Sludge Into Los Angeles Sewer, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 817 (Sept. 6, 1985) (A municipal
court levied a $600,000 penalty upon Arrowhead Water Co. of Los Angeles after the firm
pleaded no contest to charges of dumping paint sludge and acids into the city's sewer system);
Jail Sentence Imposed on Manager, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 817 (Sept. 6, 1985) ("The manager
of a precious metals extracting plant was sentenced to 60 days in jail after pleading no contest
to one count of dumping cyanide and acids into [Los Angeles'] sewer system").
121. See Marshall, supra note 120, at 1130 (Adrian Gross, a former FDA investigator who
launched a federal investigation of Industrial Bio-Test, said he became suspicious about the
research laboratory and its scientists' data because IBT'S data were "unbelievably clean,"
proving the safety of the laboratory products too convincingly. Going over some of IBT's raw
data, Gross saw a term he had never come across before. "TBD, TBD, I kept seeing it and
I wondered, what the hell is that?" Gross recalled. It stood for "too badly decomposed."
There was total breakdown in animal care at IBT yet no studies that were submitted to the
government reflected what had happened. Id. at 1131.). See also Schneider, Faking It, THE
Amicus J. 14, 14-21 (Spring 1982) (discusses the fraud at IBT laboratories). See generally A.
BLOCK & F. ScAx'rrr, supra note 27 (outlines the extent to which organized crime has infiltrated
the waste disposal industry).
122. A container the size of a garbage can filled with PCBs can cost $10,000 to remove
from a site. Ryon, Toxic Waste: Past Misuse that Haunts the Present, L.A. Times, Nov. 3,
1985, Part VII, at 1, col. 3.
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the subsequent illegal dumping. Second, haulers and treaters of hazardous
waste have an incentive to contract for toxic waste and then cut costs through
illegitimate disposal. Five congressional hearings, which include FBI inform-
ant testimony, indicate that criminal activities, such as mail and wire fraud,
occur regularly within industries involved with hazardous waste.'2
Toxic waste victims owning contaminated land and farms situated near
leaking waste sites should be able to establish mail or wire fraud violations
by either the waste dumper, the waste generator, or both.'1' It is not easy
to run a business without using the telephone or the mail. Generators, haulers
and disposers of toxic material all communicate hazardous waste information
at least to the government if not the public. Before and during discovery,
the RICO plaintiff should search for any evidence of written or oral com-
munications that falsely represented waste practices as being safer than the
123. (1) Profile of Organized Crime: Great Lakes Region: Hearings Before the Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (considers the problem of illegal hazardous waste disposal
and related investigatory operations in Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio);
(2) Profile of Organized Crime: Mid-Atlantic Region: Hearings Before the Per-
manent Subcomm. on Investigations of Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) (background on organized crime's 1950-1960's in-
volvement in the commercial sanitation industry; evidence of organized crime
control of major solid and toxic waste disposal industries in New York and New
Jersey; examples of deficiencies in State and Federal toxic waste disposal enforce-
ment);
(3) EPA's Law Enforcement Authority: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Ov-
ersight and Investigation of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) (review of extent of organized crime involvement in
hazardous waste disposal industry);
(4) Organized Crime Links to the Waste Disposal Industry: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (examination of FBI informant allegations
tying a major disposal firm with organized crime and illegal hauling and disposal
of toxic material); and
(5) Organized Crime and Hazardous Waste Disposal: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (overview of investigations into organized
crime infiltration of toxic waste businesses).
124. BLOCK & ScAIMnIr, supra note 27, at 278-308 (provides a national overview of the
ways in which waste is illegally disposed). A toxic waste victim can be a corporation as well
as an individual. In order to get rid of toxic material, generators of hazardous waste usually
have to contract with transporters and waste treatment facilities. If a transporter or a treatment
facility disposes of a generator's waste illegitimately, the generator is liable, along with the
transporter and treatment facility, for all removal costs and damage to natural resources. See
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607
(1980). A generator of hazardous waste, such as IBM, General Motors, or Dow Chemical, can
bring a RICO claim against transporters or treatment facilities who contract with the generator
for legitimate waste disposal and who then illegally dump the generator's waste and pocket the
high disposal fees charged to the generator. In such a situation, the generator suffers business
injury because the generator is liable for the illegitimate dumping. In addition, business injury
would also result in the form of damage to reputation due to public outrage over the dumping
of the generator's waste. See infra notes 183-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
RICO requirement of injury to business or property from an individual rather than a corporate
perspective.
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company knew them to be or that concealed health and environmental
information known to the company about its hazardous substances. Com-
panies dealing with hazardous waste are required under the Resource Con-
seration and Recovery Act' 25 to document everything that happens to their
waste, by mailing reports to the E.P.A. Potential RICO litigants should look
for mailings that distort scientific studies to favor the company and that
underestimate incidents of careless and illegitimate dumping. Hazardous
waste victims also should examine closely all company letters dealing with
hazardous waste licensing or hazardous waste disposal contracts in order to
uncover falsely detailed descriptions of waste disposal. Additionally, if a
company does not file a required RCRA report on its hazardous waste and
the E.P.A. calls the company in order to determine why the report was not
sent, any communication by the company to the Agency is subject to the
Wire Fraud Act's prohibitions. 26
Determining whether a communication signifies a scheme to defraud re-
quires evidence that the defendant acted with reckless disregard for the truth
or falsity of its hazardous waste representations. A person acts recklessly as
to a material element of an offense when he consciously ignores a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his
actions. 2 7 The risk must be of such a degree and nature that, considering
the purpose and nature of the person's conduct and the circumstances known
to him, disregard of the risk involves a gross deviation from the standard
of conduct that a law-abiding citizen would observe if that citizen were in
the risk-taker's position.' 28 An injured waste victim is likely to convince a
jury of a defendant's "recklessness" if the victim can show that the defendant
engaged in careless disposal of leachable waste which is known to be highly
toxic, if not lethal, to some mammals. Such evidence indicates a disregard
for the consequences of hazardous waste disposal and an indifference to the
safety of life, limb, and property of others.
Unless the plaintiff has complained personally to the defendant generator
or disposer, evidence of fraud will most likely come from communication
125. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922, 6923, 6924 (1976) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act. See infra note 206 for more background on these sections of RCRA.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Soteras, 770 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1985) (telephone calls made
for the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud violate the Wire Fraud Act); United States
v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983) (in prosecution for wire fraud, circumstantial evidence
that telephone calls were made for the purpose of committing wire fraud is sufficient to sustain
a conviction); United States v. Davanzo, 699 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1983) (evidence that telephone
calls were intended to further a scheme to defraud was sufficient to sustain the defendants'
wire fraud convictions even though the telephone conversations included opinions on the
scheme's feasibility and the scheme was later abandoned); United States v. Martin, 611 F.2d
801 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1082 (1979) (circumstantial evidence, including testimony
that a telephone was used in connection with all grain shipments made on behalf of the
company, was sufficient to permit an inference that an interstate call was made in connection
with fraudulent grain shipment).
127. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985).
128. Id.
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between the defendant(s) and the government. Mail fraud claims by waste
victims exist even if a defendant mails misleading waste information to or omits
relevant disposal data from its response to government inquiries. In United
States v. Mandel, the Fourth Circuit observed:
[F]raudulent nondisclosure or concealment of facts may be evidence to
support a conviction [under] the mail fraud statute ... when there has
been a fraudulent statement of facts, or a deliberate concealment thereof,
to a public body. The scheme to defraud can be said to encompass not
only the receipt of the illicit benefit, but also the deprivation of the
public of the right to have its officials act on other than false infor-
mation. 29
The hazardous waste victim need not receive the defendant's fraudulent
mailings because the Mail Fraud Act requires only that the mails be used
in an attempt to execute a conceived scheme. 30 Section 1964(c) of RICO,
however, requires plaintiffs to show injury and, therefore, the success of
the scheme to defraud. The plaintiff can meet the requirements of section
1964(c) without ever seeing the defendant's fraudulent mailings to the gov-
ernment. All that is necessary is that the corporation lull the government
into inaction with the result that the corporation is allowed to carelessly
dispose of leaking toxic waste. 3 '
Hazardous waste victims must use caution in pleading mail or wire fraud
under RICO'3 2 because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that
fraudulent circumstances be stated with particularity.'33 Rule 9(b) does not
require that all elements of an offense which includes fraud be pleaded with
specificity3 4 but it does require particularity concerning the time, place, and
content of the alleged misrepresentation(s).3 5 Malice, intent, and other mental
conditions are elements that may be pleaded in a general manner. 3 6 Rule
129. 591 F.2d at 1364.
130. United States v. Sorce, 308 F. 2d 299 (1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 957. See also United
States v. International Term Papers, Inc., 477 F.2d 1277, 1279 (1st Cir. 1973) (under mail
fraud statute it is not necessary that the mailing be between the perpetrator and victim. Any
mailing in connection with a scheme is enough.)
131. In Terre Du Lac Ass'n, Inc. v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 772 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1985), the
court refused to dismiss a RICO claim for indirect injury resulting from the defendant's mailing
of false property reports to individuals other than the plaintiffs. The plaintiff property owners
were not directly injured by the defendant developer's acts of mail fraud. However, the plaintiffs
alleged sufficient RICO injury by claiming that their maintenance costs increased due to the
defendant's use of fraudulently-gained funds for things other than property improvements. See
also Pandick v. Rooney, 632 F. Supp. 1430, 1433 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (To state a claim under civil
RICO, the plaintiff need not allege that he or she was the target of fraudulent predicate acts
as long as the plaintiff was the victim of an illegal operation of the enterprise).
132. Allegations of location of allegedly false statements as being a "pamphlet," "promo-
tional material," or "a typical life-care contract," and allegations of representations of "various
other defendants" for allegedly false statements under civil RICO were not sufficiently particular
to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1062 (8th Cir.
1982), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 710 F.2d 1361, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct 527 (1983).
133. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
134. Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southernmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984).
135. McGinty v. Beranger Volkswagen Inc., 633 F.2d 226, 228 (1st Cir. 1980).
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
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9(b) should be read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a), which allows pleading of short and plain statements of fact and claim. 7
These two federal rules were designed in order to give defendants fair notice
of the allegations against them. Plaintiffs need only plead facts which will
place the defendant on notice of the activity alleged to be fraudulent. If a
waste victim is initially unable to find sufficient RICO evidence to meet
Rule 9(b), she can always commence a common law tort claim in order
to use discovery procedures to uncover evidence of mail or wire fraud and
then amend the complaint to state a RICO claim if evidence of fraud is
found.
C. Pattern
Hazardous waste victims must establish that they have been injured by a
"pattern" of racketeering activity. One mail or wire fraud violation con-
cerning waste disposal practices by a company fails to satisfy the "pattern"
element within RICO. Section 1961(5) defines a "pattern" of racketeering
activity as requiring at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which
occurred after October 5, 1970, the year of the ratification of RICO, and
the last of which occurred within ten years of the commission of a prior
racketeering act. 3 The statutory language of section 1961(5) suggests that
several racketeering incidents must occur before a "pattern" materializes;
two acts might not suffice. Reason and common sense compel the conclusion
that the term "pattern" does not mean isolated or accidental occurrences
but rather incorporates regular and repeated activity. The Senate Report on
RICO supports this inference by characterizing "pattern" as having "con-
tinuity plus relationship."' 3 9 In a footnote in Sedima, the Supreme Court refer-
red to the Senate Report's definition of "pattern" as a test for determining
when a "pattern" is produced."'
1. Relationship Element
Neither the Senate Report on RICO nor the Supreme Court in Sedima
provide any indication as to the type of racketeering activity relationship
which must be pleaded in order to adequately meet the "pattern" requirement
137. See Pandick, 632 F. Supp. at 1436 (Rule 9(b), requiring fraud to be pleaded with
particularity, applies to civil RICO pleadings, as does liberal, notice-pleading philosophy of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
139. S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969), quoted in Sedima, 105 S. Ct at
3285 n. 14.
140. In Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14, the Supreme Court analyzed the legislative history
of RICO and elaborated upon the "pattern" element: "The target of [RICO] is ... not sporadic
activity. The infiltration of legitimate businesses normally requires more than one 'racketeering
activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus
relationship which combines to produce a pattern."
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of RICO.' The federal courts are in dispute concerning what the rack-
eteering activity must be related to in order for a "pattern" to emerge. The
controversy is whether a RICO plaintiff can plead only that the defendant's
racketeering acts are related to the activity of the "enterprise" or whether
the plaintiff must additionally plead that the defendant's racketeering acts are
themselves related. In other words, is there enough relatedness of racketeering
activity for a "pattern" to develop when a victim is injured by an "enter-
prise" which commits one act of mail fraud and one act of bribery or can
a "pattern" develop only if an "enterprise" commits one type of racket-
eering, like several acts of mail fraud? Section 1962 provides the answer.'4 2
The language in section 1962, proscribing association with an "enterprise"
"through" or "from" a pattern of racketeering activity, requires only that
the predicate offenses be related to the affairs or conduct of the "enter-
prise.' t43 There is no statutory basis in RICO, as some courts have found,
for a nexus requirement between the predicate acts themselves. Courts should
find therefore only two requirements for establishment of the "relationship"
criterion of the "pattern" element under RICO. First, two acts of racket-
eering must be independently established. Second, each prohibited activity
must be then connected to the affairs of the "enterprise."
In most instances hazardous waste victims who invoke RICO will only be
able to use mail or wire fraud as the predicate acts of racketeering; hazardous
waste victims, for the most part, will not be involved in fact situations where
the victims are injured by two different, unrelated acts of racketeering, such
as one act of bribery and one act of mail fraud. As a result, whenever
RICO plaintiffs injured by toxic waste allege several acts of mail, or wire,
fraud, they will always be able to show that the predicate acts were related
to each other as well as to the "enterprise." The plaintiff's complaint, then,
should reflect both levels of relatedness in order to meet all tests of rela-
tionship used by the courts in determining whether a "pattern" exists.
141. The only enlightenment given by the Supreme Court on the type of "pattern" rela-
tionship required was when the Court quoted 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982):
[C]riminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the
same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission,
or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
events.
The court suggested that the language in 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) may be useful in interpreting
other sections of RICO. Sedima, 105 S. Ct at 3285 n.14. The Court, however, did not indicate
whether racketeering acts must be related both to each other and to the "enterprise," or whether
the acts can be related only to the "enterprise" or can be related only to one another.
142. See supra note 42 which cites § 1962 in full.
143. Several courts only require RICO plaintiffs to show that the defendant's predicate acts
were related to the affairs of the "enterprise." In United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322,
1331-33 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984), the court recognized that predicate
acts only need to have some effect on the "enterprise" in order to form a "pattern." Thus,
if a defendant committed mail fraud, a predicate offense, and also obstructed a criminal
investigation, another predicate offense, a "pattern" of racketeering activity would not exist
unless these two racketeering acts affected the "enterprise" in some fashion. See United States
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2. Continuity Element
The legislative history of RICO, as well as Sedima, require that racketeering
activity be continuous as well as related in order to create a "pattern." 1 '4 Courts
interpret the continuity requirement in three different, conflicting ways. A few
courts regard several predicate acts as sufficient evidence of a threat of continu-
ing activity.' 5 Some courts, however, require numerous predicate offenses ex-
ecuted over time in order to establish continuity of racketeering activity. 46
Still other courts require multiple episodes of criminal activity, and these
courts all view predicate acts performed in execution of one proscribed
offense to be one episode of criminal activity. 47 Obviously, the multiple
v. Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197, 199 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (defendant's employment by General Motors
plant and unlawful debt collection on the plant's premises failed to establish relatedness nexus),
aff'd, 625 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1980). The Cauble court observed that the requisite effect upon
the "enterprise" may be direct, as in the deposit of funds into the "enterprise's" bank account,
or the effect can be indirect, as in maintaining the "enterprise's" present customers. Cauble,
706 F.2d at 1333 n.24. See also Martino, 648 F.2d at 381, 403 (RICO proscribes the furthering
of the "enterprise," not the predicate acts-predicate acts therefore must be related only to
the affairs of the "enterprise"); Zerman v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. Civ. 4527 (MP), slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1986) (Second Circuit dismissed all but one of the plaintiff's claims of
misrepresentation. In an attempt to establish a "pattern" of racketeering activity, the plaintiff
referred to Hutton's well-publicized guilty plea for overdrawing its bank accounts. The allegation
that Hutton engaged in an overdrafting scheme was insufficient to establish a "pattern" of
racketeering activity because there was no relationship between Hutton's overdrafting and the
plaintiff's misrepresentation claim).
Many courts impose a stricter pleading requirement for the "pattern" relationship than the
one used in Cauble. These other courts hold that a "pattern" is produced only by related
racketeering acts that are also related to the "enterprise." See, e.g., Pandick, 632 F. Supp. at
1435 ("The proximity in time, the identity of the culprits and the similarity of the alleged
securities violations establish a sufficient relationship among the predicate acts."); Ackerman,
Jablonski, Porterfield & DeTure v. Alhadeff, No. C85-2274V, slip op. (W.D. Wash. April 16,
1986) ("[P]laintiffs have alleged that Anderson has committed fraud and securities violations
in its participation in the . . . offering. This offering lends the required relationship to the
separate predicate acts."); Medallion, 627 F. Supp. at 1296 (relatedness of predicate offenses
established through proof of common perpetrators or victims, or similar purposes, results, or
methods of commission); Inryco, 615 F. Supp. at 828 ("pattern" connotes similarity, thus the
predicate acts must be connected with each other). These courts which hold that racketeering
acts must be both related to each other as well as to the "enterprise" wrongly restrict the scope
of RICO. Such a view is unsupported by the statutory language in § 1962 of RICO.
144. See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14; S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969).
145. See, e.g., R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985) (two
acts of mail fraud committed five months apart, though part of a single fraudulent scheme,
constitute a "pattern"); Volckmann, No. C-85-4209 (WHO), slip op., (continuity of racketeering
activity exists when two or more acts of mail or securities fraud occur).
146. In Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Industries, 770 F.2d 718, 719 n.l (8th Cir. 1985),
the court observed that the continuity "pattern" requirement is satisfied by an amended
complaint alleging 58 acts of mail and wire fraud, which were all committed by the same
individuals using the same fraudulent method. See also Philatelic Found. v. Kaplan, No. 85
Civ. 8577 (RWS), slip. op., (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 1985) (328 predicate acts committed in order
to defraud an individual illustrate continuing activity); Bank of America., 782 F.2d at 971 (nine
separate acts of mail and wire fraud, involving the same parties over a three year period, for
the purpose of convincing a bank to extend credit satisfies the "pattern" requirement).
147. See Modem Settings, Inc. v. Prudential-Bache Securities, 629 F. Supp. 860, 864 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) ("Each of the multiple sales involved in the liquidation may indeed violate the securities
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episode test is the most stringent interpretation of the continuity "pattern"
requirement.
Judge Shadur, in Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc.,'4
was one of the first to espouse a multiple episode test. He stated:
[The word "pattern"] connotes a multiplicity of events. Surely the con-
tinuity inherent in the term presumes repeated criminal activity, not
merely repeated acts to carry out the same criminal activity. It places a
real strain on the language to speak of a single fraudulent effort, im-
plemented by several fraudulent acts, as a 'pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity.'
9
Under a multiple episode test, a "pattern" of racketeering activity emerges
only when a RICO "person" perpetrates fraud upon more than one victim
in separate encounters while following the same method in each encounter.' 0
Those courts requiring multiple episodes in order to show continuity of
racketeering activity define "pattern" in an unduly restrictive manner. To
be sure, evidence of multiple episodes establishes a "pattern" of racketeering
activity, but limiting the scope of RICO to multiple episodes leaves out
much racketeering activity which is both continuous and related. The Su-
preme Court in Sedima stated that courts must refrain from imposing re-
strictions on RICO that do not clearly flow from the federal statute's plain
language. '5,
Continuity of racketeering activity refers to either multiple episodes or
multiple acts. The essence of one criminal episode is that it consists of
many racketeering violations.5 2 Thus, the very fact that an episode exists
laws; however, each is but part of a single transaction. . . . There is no pattern of racketeering
activity in the liquidation alone, regardless of the number of sales required to consummate
it."); Professional Assets Management, Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, N.A., 616 F. Supp. 1418,
1421 (W.D. Okla. 1985) ( a "single unified transaction," though consisting of several "con-
stituent actions," is not a pattern); Agristor, 634 F. Supp. at 1226 (mailings of allegedly
fraudulent materials were an effort to further the defendant's sales. This entails only a single
scheme and does not establish a pattern of racketeering activity).
148. 615 F. Supp. 828.
149. Id. at 831.
150. Id. at 831-33. See Papagiannis v. Pontikis, 108 F.R.D. 177, 179 (N.S. II1. 1985) (a
person injured by a defendant's racketeering activity can use evidence of other predicate acts
against other victims to prove the existence of a "pattern").
151. Before Sedima, many courts read a "racketeering injury" or a "competitive injury"
requirement into the RICO statute. These courts required plaintiffs to establish not only injury
to business or property, as mandated by § 1964(c), but also to prove that the injury occurred
by conduct that RICO was designed to deter. 105 S. Ct at 3284-87. The Court chastised the
lower courts for creating new, additional RICO requirements, and the Court upheld a less
restrictive reading of RICO: "Any recoverable damages occurring by reason of a violation of
Section 1962(c) will flow from the commission of the predicate acts.... Such damages include,
but are not limited to, the sort of competitive injury for which the dissenters would allow
recovery." Id. at 3286 n.15 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court cautioned courts to read
RICO broadly and to leave any alterations of "perceived" defects in the statute to Congress.
Id. at 3287.
152. See, e.g., Inryco, 615 F. Supp. at 832 ("the common sense interpretation of the word
'pattern' implies acts occurring in different criminal episodes") (emphasis added); Medallion,
627 F. Supp. at 1297 ("a 'pattern' of racketeering activity must include racketeering acts
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err in their interpretation of "pattern" only insofar as they rule that one episode,
or numerous acts, do not also establish continuity of racketeering activity.
In order to determine whether continuity of racketeering activity is present in
future illegal waste disposal cases, RICO plaintiffs are forewarned that courts
may use evidence of (1) ongoing schemes, or episodes, as well as (2) evidence of
numerous' 53 predicate acts. 1 '4 Harardous waste victims however should be able
to meet both these tests for continuity. In a typical hazardous waste situation
involving mail or wire fraud, a polluter will have repeatedly mailed over time
fraudulent environmental reports to several agencies. A new episode of mall
fraud is produced each time an agency engages in new licensing or a new
investigation of the polluter. Each separate licensing or investigation should
involve several uses of the mall by the polluter. Hazardous waste victims are
advised to plead, whenever possible, that several episodes of mail or wire fraud,
which consisted of numerous acs in execution of each episode, transpired.
If a victim can do this, then the "pattern" allegations should survive any
motion to dismiss.
3. Statute of Limitations Considerations
Reflected by the "Pattern" Element
By using RICO, toxic tort victims can avoid the statute of limitations
problems which still linger in some common law jurisdictions. As seen earlier,
toxic tort injury is latent injury which usually occurs long after many state limi-
tation periods expire.155
Congress chose not to specify in RICO any limitation on when a private
civil action may be brought. When a federal statute does not contain a
limitations period, the federal courts apply the most analogous state statute
of limitations.3 6 Although state law is referred to in order to determine the
sufficiently unconnected in time and substance to warrant consideration as separate criminal
episodes").
153. Two predicate acts are insufficiently numerous to constitute a "pattern." In Sedima,
the Court observed that "in common parlance two of anything do not generally form a
'pattern.' " Id. at 105 S. Ct at 3285 n.14. Thus, cases like R.A.G.S., 774 F.2d 1350, and
Volckmann, No. C-85-4209 (WHO), slip. op., which hold that two related acts of mail fraud
are sufficient to create a "pattern" wrongfully stretch the language of RICO. At a minimum,
three predicate offenses must occur in order for the threat of continuing activity to be established.
See Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Wallace Computer Serv., Inc., No. 85C 4415, slip. op. (N.D.
111. May 23, 1986) (three related mail fraud acts against one victim produces a "pattern" of
racketeering, activity).
154. Combining proper "relatedness" analysis, see supra notes 141-44 and accompanying
text, and proper "continuity" analysis, minimal compliance with the "pattern" element of
RICO occurs when a defendant over a ten year period commits three different predicate offenses
against three different victims.
155. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. Cancer can take decades to develop and
migration of wastes onto property is very slow.
156. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1942 (1985). In Wilson, the Court described
two approaches to borrowing of state statute of limitations. A court can either uniformly
characterize all claims arising under the federal statute for limitations period purposes and then apply
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length of the statute of limitations for the federal statute, the Supreme Court,
in Rawlings v. Ray,'57 held that federal law determines the date from which the
limitations period begins to run. The federal courts consistently apply a discovery
rule to civil RICO actions, holding that the "borrowed" state limitations period
begins to toll when the victim either knows or should know that injury
to business or property has occurred. 5 8 As long as waste victims have been
injured by a "pattern" of racketeering activity and they plead a civil RICO
claim, they are assured of obtaining the benefit of this federal discovery
rule. 59
D. Enterprise
Hazardous waste victims must establish that the defendants' "pattern" of
racketeering activity affected or operated through an "enterprise." The
the most analogous state statute of limitations to every claim or it can look to the specific
facts of each case and then choose which limitations period is most analogous to the plaintiff's
claim. Id. at 1943. In Wilson, the Court's concern for uniformity led it to choose the first
approach. It selected New Mexico's personal injury statute of limitations to govern all claims
arising under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Id.
Under RICO, a federal court can choose to apply different limitations periods depending
upon the type of predicate offense alleged or it can determine which state limitations period
most nearly characterizes a RICO claim. In Wilson, the Court held that selection of a uniform
limitations period for all § 1983 actions was required by the legislative history of the Civil
Rights statute. Id. at 1945-49. Courts confronted with RICO claims are going to have to
determine which borrowing approach to use. To date, some courts have followed a Wilson
line of reasoning while others apply varying limitations periods depending upon the type of
predicate offense alleged. Compare Victoria Oil Co. v. Lancaster Corp., 587 F. Supp. 429,
431 (D. Colo. 1984) ("Whether RICO is regarded as a right and remedy created entirely by
statute, or as a remedy for injury to property, none of the more specific Colorado statutes of
limitation seems to cover it .... In McKay, the Tenth Circuit held that the Colorado residuary
statute of limitations . . . applied to Section 1983 claims because no other Colorado statute
seemed appropriate. I conclude similarly that [the same three year residuary limitations period]
applies to civil RICO claims") with State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540
F. Supp. 673, 684-85 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (Indiana courts apply Indiana's six year fraud limitations
period when RICO plaintiffs allege mail or wire fraud).
157. 312 U.S. 96 (1941).
158. See, e.g., Bowling v. Founders Title Co., 773 F.2d 1175, 1178 (lth Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1516 (1986); Alexander v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 729 F.2d 576, 577 (8th Cir.
1984); Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984).
159. The "pattern" element within RICO permits ten years between predicate offenses. See
supra note 138 and accompanying text. With most toxic injury, it is possible for the defendant's
predicate offenses to occur closely together and for the injury to remain latent many years
after the "pattern" of racketeering ended. The discovery rule modification applied by federal
courts in civil RICO actions prevents the plaintiff's claim from being time-barred until the
plaintiff's injury develops. However, if the plaintiff's toxic injury happens to manifest during
the defendant's "pattern" of racketeering activity, the "borrowed" state limitations period will
begin to run from the time the plaintiff first knew or should have known of the manifestation.
In this type of situation, the limitations period will not run from the time of the defendant's
last predicate offense. Thus, if a plaintiff is aware of an injury from a "pattern" of racketeering
in year one, the limitations period begins to run from year one, even though RICO allows ten
years for a "pattern" to develop. See Bowling, 773 F.2d at 1178 (state statute of limitations
begins to run when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of an injury, not after commission
of the last predicate act); Compton, 732 "F.2d at 1432-33 (mere continuance of a conspiracy
beyond the date when injury transpired does not delay accrual of the limitations period).
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definition of "enterprise" in RICO is extremely broad. Section 1961(4) states
that an "enterprise" includes "any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity."' 6 Thus, two categories of
"enterprises" are present under section 1961(4): legal entities and factual
entities.
The existence of an "enterprise" under RICO is a separate element of
the statute and must be pleaded apart from the "pattern" of racketeering
activity. In United States v. Turkette, the Supreme Court held that an
"enterprise" is not a "pattern" of racketeering activity.' 6t The Court noted
that: "[I]n order to secure a conviction under RICO, the Government must
prove both the existence of a 'enterprise' and the connected 'pattern of
racketeering activity' . . . While the proof used to establish the separate
elements may in particular cases coalesce, proof of one does not necessarily
establish the other."'16 Where legal entities are involved, proof of the "en-
terprise" element should not be problematic. Evidence of legal existence,
such as articles of incorporation, capacity to sue and be sued, or government
licensing, is sufficient to show the discrete identity of an "enterprise."
Difficulty arises when a plaintiff attempts to establish the existence of a
factual entity separate and apart from the racketeering "pattern" in which
the entity engaged.
A RICO "enterprise" must be more than the sum of its predicate rack-
eteering acts, or else the "enterprise" concept loses meaning as a viable
statutory component. ' To establish independent existence of a factual entity,
many courts, including the Supreme Court, impose three requirements upon
the plaintiff. The association must be a group of individuals associated
together for the common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct; there
must be an ongoing organization, and there must be various associates
functioning as a continuing unit.'"
Toxic waste plaintiffs generally will be concerned only with proof of legal
entities. Since organized crime, an association "in fact," has infiltrated
legitimate legal entities, such as the hazardous waste disposal industry,' 65 it
will be unlikely that a RICO waste victim will be injured solely by groups
which associate only "in fact." Organized crime, however, is not completely
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) provides: " 'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, cor-
poration, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity."
161. 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
162. Id.
163. Compare Medallion, 627 F. Supp. at 1294 (the "enterprise" must have an existence
separate and apart from the "pattern" of racketeering activity in which it engaged) with United
States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1536-37 (11 th Cir. 1985) (upheld the application of RICO
to situations in which the "enterprise" is nothing more than the sum of the individual predicate
offenses).
164. 452 U.S. at 583.
165. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 197-98 and accom-
panying text.
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responsible for illegal dumping nationwide. As seen earlier, many manufac-
turers of hazardous waste, when faced with high costs of legitimate dumping, 66
resort to illegal waste disposal.'67 In 1980, the E.P.A. registered approximately
60,000 firms as toxic substance generators.' 68 The national hazardous waste
problem clearly originates within legal entities. By presenting evidence of cor-
porate or legal existence, RICO waste plaintiffs should encounter little dif-
ficulty in establishing the existence of the "enterprise" separate from the "pat-
tern" of racketeering activity in which the "enterprise" engaged.
E. Interstate Commerce
Under section 1962'69 the activity of the "enterprise" must affect interstate
commerce.' 70 The requisite nexus between the "enterprise" and interstate
commerce need only be minimal.'' In regard to toxic waste cases, RICO
"enterprises" will affect commerce beyond state boundaries. During orga-
nized crime hearings, Senator Warren Rudman, vice chairman of the Per-
manent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, commented that interstate commerce is adversely
affected by illicit toxic dumping. He observed:
I am painfully aware of what happens when hazardous waste.., gets
transported across State lines. [I] found in the last few years that my
State of New Hampshire had become ... the dumping ground for toxic
wastes from [other] States . . . . It is my belief that this [toxic waste]
battle . . . is an interstate problem." 2
Most hazardous waste moves from a generator, through a transporter, and
on to a treatment facility. '
If the "enterprise" is a generator which illegally disposes of its own waste,
a RICO plaintiff can prove an interstate commerce effect by showing that
the supplies used in creating the waste originated outside of the generator's
state.'74 This same proof will satisfy the interstate element if the "enterprise"
166. See supra note 122.
167. See A. BLOCK & F. SCARPITTI, supra note 121, at 190-221.
168. Id. at 48.
169. See supra note 42 which cites § 1962 in full.
170. United States v. Groff, 643 F.2d 396, 400 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828
(1981) (to satisfy the interstate commerce element, it is the "enterprise" and not the individual
defendant which must engage in or affect interstate commerce); United States v. Rone, 598
F.2d 564, 573 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980) (activity of the "enterprise"
and not each predicate act of racketeering must have an effect on interstate commerce).
171. Rone, 598 F.2d at 573.
172. Profile of Organized Crime: Great Lakes Region, supra note 123, at 235.
173. Id. at 479.
174. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 656 F.2d 964 (4th Cir.1981) (supplies used in defendant's
bookmaking operations which originated outside Maryland provided a sufficient nexus between
the "enterprise" and interstate commerce to invoke § 1962).
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is a hauler of toxic waste. If the "enterprise" is a hauler, the plaintiff can
also strengthen the interstate commerce nexus by producing evidence of
interstate waste travel.'7 5 If the "enterprise" is a waste treatment facility,
the plaintiff should be able to produce similar evidence, and show also that
storage space was provided for toxic materials produced out of state.'7 6
F. By Reason Of
A hazardous waste victim must be injured in his business or property "by
reason of" a violation of section 1962 in order to obtain standing to sue
under section 1964(b).' 71 Some courts stringently interpret the "by reason
of" language in section 1964(c) in order to narrow the scope of liability
under section 1962. Heritage Insurance Company of America and Prestige
Casualty Co. v. First National Bank of Cicero'17 is a recent case in which
the scope of section 1962(a) was narrowly restricted by a court's use of the
"by reason of" language in section 1964(c). The court held that claims under
subsection (a) must allege an investment injury as well as injury to business
and property. According to the majority's reasoning, plaintiffs injured by
a "person's" predicate acts do not have a claim under section 1962(a) unless
their business or property injury also resulted from the "person's" use of
money which was illegally obtained from the predicate acts.
The Heritage court attempts to rewrite section 1962(a) and section 1964(c).
Section 1964(c) provides a private RICO cause of action to anyone vic-
timized by reason of a section 1962 violation. Sectin 1962(a) prohibits
"persons" from using or investing, directly or indirectly, money derived
from a pattern of racketeering activity in the operation or establishment of
an enterprise. A "person" therefore violates section 1962(a) by both com-
mitting racketeering acts and then funnelling the illegal gain into the enter-
prise. The Heritage court erroneously concludes that a "person" can only
violate sections 1962 and 1964(c) by injuring a plaintiff through the "per-
son's" use of the racketeering profits. There are, however, other instances
in which a defendant may violate sections 1962 and 1964(c). For example,
175. See, e.g., United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1980) (the interstate
commerce nexus is strengthened by the dispatch of couriers from the Northeast to Florida to
pick up drug shipments).
176. See, e.g., United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 850-51 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 951 (1978) (By providing rental space for trailers manufactured out of state, the
"enterprise" indirectly fostered interstate sales of mobile homes. Proof of the sales established
the necessary connection, for purposes of § 1962, between the "enterprise" and interstate
commerce.).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district
court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
178. 629 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
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a "person" also violates these sections by injuring a plaintiff through a
pattern of racketeering activity and then using the illegally-obtained funds
in the operation of the enterprise. By requiring that plaintiffs must plead
an investment injury under section 1962, the Heritage court rewrote sub-
section (a) and performed a legislative, rather than judicial, function.
In Sedima,17 9 the Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's similar
attempt to rewrite another section of RICO, section 1964(c). The Second
Circuit required RICO plaintiffs to show, in addition to business or property
injury, injury caused by an activity which RICO was designed to deter."'
In referring to the language in all subsections of section 1962, the Court
observed first, if a defendant engages in a racketeering pattern in a manner
forbidden by section 1962, and second, the racketeering pattern injures the
plaintiff's business or property, the plaintiff has a claim for treble damages
under section 1964(c).18' Thus, the Court found "no room in the statutory
language for an additional, amorphous 'racketeering injury' requirement.' 8 s2
Just as there is no room in the wording of RICO for a racketeering injury
requirement, there is no room in its wording for the Heritage court's in-
vestment injury requirement either.
G. Business or Property Injury8 3
Once a section 1962 violation is established, the RICO plaintiff must
produce evidence that the violation injured his business or property.18 Since
the injury requirement in RICO is not restricted to narrow "racketeering"
concepts,8 5 it should receive an expansive interpretation by the courts. Toxic
179. 105 S. Ct. 3284-85.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 3285.
182. Id.
183. A controversial issue currently splitting the courts is whether injunctive relief is available
to private plaintiffs in a RICO action. Compare Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp.
576, 581-84 (1983) (while treble damages can be awarded in a civil RICO action, equitable
remedies are unavailable) and Dement v. Abbott Capital Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1378, 1381-83
(N.D. I1. 1984) (injunctive relief unavailable to civil RICO plaintiffs) with Chambers Devel-
opment Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1540-41 (W.D. Penn. 1984) (equitable
relief is available to private parties under RICO). See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975),
and Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), for a discussion
concerning implied right of action.
Hazardous waste victims in need of injunctive relief do not need to argue for an implied
right of action under RICO § 1964. Almost every federal environmental statute contains a
citizen's suit provision which provides equitable remedies for private plaintiffs. See, e.g., Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604; Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365; § 4911;
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972; Toxic Substances Control
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619; and Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3005-8. No federal envi-
ronmental statute allows a private plaintiff to sue polluters for personal injury damages.
184. See supra note 44 where 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) is cited in full.
185. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text for discussion concerning the Supreme
Court's rejection of a racketeering injury requirement in RICO.
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injury manifests itself in many ways. In a study of 350 waste disposal sites,
the E.P.A. determined that leaking waste had destroyed nearby water supplies
and groundwater."' The E.P.A. also observed that toxic leachate had con-
taminated both humans and animals. 87
A farmer can claim a business, as well as a property, injury if his cattle
accumulate toxic contaminants or die from waste exposure. If his cows,
pigs, and chickens possess high concentrations of toxic substances within
their tissue, the farmer will not be able to sell any milk, pork, beef, poultry,
or eggs. Farmers should also claim business injury for loss of irrigation
supplies as well as for loss of crops when both become contaminated by
toxic leachate. Farmers and nonfarmers alike can claim property and business
damages if their land accumulates hazardous waste. Once land is contami-
nated by hazardous substances it becomes unsalable since it will remain
contaminated for decades. Most toxic chemicals have complex, molecular
structures which resist environmental degradation. 8 8 PCBs, one type of
hazardous waste, may be active toxic agents for years.' 89
RICO has a potential disadvantage for some hazardous waste victims who
contemplate filing racketeering claims. Personal injury is unrecoverable under
the statute. 190 Plaintiffs, however, should not be easily discouraged. If a
victim incurs RICO damage to both his person and property or business,
there exists a strong possibility that the property or business damage recovery
will be substantial enough to compensate for personal injury as well. For
example, if the plaintiff proves each RICO element and establishes that his
land is worth X amount, or that it will cost X amount to clean up the
property, the plaintiff will recover 3X amount under the treble damages
provision. For every dollar of property or business that is injured through
the defendant's racketeering, two dollars will accrue in punitive damages.
If a waste victim were to gain $200,000 under civil RICO for contaminated
186. EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM: HAzARDoUs WASTE, supra note 4, at 1-8.
187. Id. In 1972, waste containing hexachlorobenzene (HCB) was disposed of in a landfill
in Louisiana. The HCB vaporized and subsequently accumulated in cattle over a 100 square
mile area. The cattle had to be destroyed, representing a direct economic loss of over $380,000.
In 1976, an Indiana family consumed milk contaminated with twice the maximum concentration
of PCB considered safe by the F.D.A. The milk came from the family cow, which had been
grazing in a pasture fertilized with the City of Bloomington's sewage sludge. The sludge
contained high levels of PCBs from a local manufacturing plant and as such contaminated the
farmland for decades. The farm family in this latter case incurred both property and business
injuries.
188. See I. TINSLEY, supra note 26, at 149-54. See also C. W. FETTER, JR., APPLIED
HYDROGEOLOGY 366 (1980) (Table 10.2 lists chemicals and biological contaminants which cause
groundwater contamination).
189. I. TINSLEY, supra note 26, at 153.
190. Some states have enacted racketeering laws which cover personal injury as well as injury
to business or property. See, e.g., IDAHo CODE § 18-7801 to -7805 and UTAH CODE § 76-10-
1601 to -08 (both specifically allow for personal injury recovery). Indiana allows recovery for
injury without limiting the type of injury required. See INDIANA CODE §§ 34-4-30.5-1 to 6;
§ 35-45-6-1, -2.
19871
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
property, or loss of business, $400,000 would remain to be applied to personal
injury, emotional distress, or fear of cancer.
Under RICO, hazardous waste victims should not encounter causative
difficulty in establishing business or property injury. Tests are available for
measuring organic pollutants in the environment. Analytical chemists can
determine the levels of accumulated man-made toxins in a variety of sub-
stances, including soil, air, water, blood, and tissue.' 9' Although a plaintiff
will have difficulty using data from these tests to prove personal injury
causation, he will have no problem in establishing harm to his business or
property.'9
2
H. Organized Crime Connection
Some courts suggest that it is outrageous to bring racketeering charges
against legitimate business people.' 93 They believe RICO is meant to be used
only against organized crime and consider organized crime to be a readily
identifiable body consisting of criminal syndicates like the Mafia. This theory
indicates that Congress limited the- use of RICO to inflitration of legitimate
businesses by individuals associated with organized crime and that any other
use of the statute is burdensome, stigmatizing, and contrary to congressional
intent.
The Supreme Court and the legislative history of RICO, however, indicate
that hazardous waste victims do not need to establish organized crime af-
filiation with RICO defendants. In Turkette, the Court ruled that the "en-
terprise" element encompasses both legitimate as well as illegitimate
businesses. 94 Elaborating on the Turkette doctrine, the Supreme Court, in
Sedima, addressed the Second Circuit's concern that civil RICO was being
used against respected, legitimate businesses.' 95 The Court recognized that
legitimate businesses are capable of performing illegal acts and are not
immune from subsequent criminal or civil enforcement. '6
When courts or commentators advocate narrow constructions of RICO
they intend to fight a battle in a judicial forum which they convincingly lost
in a legislative forum. In both Turkette and Sedima the Supreme Court
recognized that civil RICO embodies a conduct-based approach to racket-
191. See i. TINSLEY, supra note 26, at 153.
192. The indeterminate plaintiff problem, see supra note 23 and accompanying text, does
not exist when business or property, rather than personal, injury is involved. It may be impossible
to determine which individuals did or did not contract cancer from exposure to a defendant's
chemicals, but by performing a few tests, it is relatively easy to determine whose land or farm
animals have accumulated hazardous waste.
193. See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3287 (Court noted that the Second Circuit's restrictive readings
of RICO were prompted by the Circuit's distress at the fact that RICO is being used as a tool
in everyday fraud cases).
194. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
195. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285-87.
196. Id.
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eering and is intended to be a flexible tool through which infiltration of
legitimate businesses by organized criminal activity can be prevented and
deterred. RICO therefore makes unlawful any participation in racketeering
activity no matter who engages in it, whether the individual be a Godfather,
a Harvard business school graduate, a hazardous waste disposer, or all
three.
Although the Supreme Court held that no organized crime ties need to
be established by litigants, hazardous waste contamination cases often do
involve stereotypical organized crime elements. Hearings in 1981 before
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the House Committee
on Energy and Commerce probed organized crime's links to the toxic waste
industry. 197 Congressman John D. Dingell, chairman of the Subcommittee,
concluded:
It is appalling enough when disposers of hazardous waste, through in-
advertence or ignorance, recklessly poison the environment and endanger
the public health. But it is considerably more disturbing when generators,
haulers, and disposers-in order to avoid the cost of legitimate disposal-
engage in the practice of illicit dumping for profit. In the course of the
inquiries of the subcommittee, we have developed information linking
organized crime to the illegal dumping of toxic substances. This comes
as no surprise. In fact, it was predictable, given the lucrative nature of
this activity.19'
Toxic waste disposal cases, therefore, fit perfectly within the structure and
purpose of RICO.
III. RICO REFORM
Within the past year, especially since the Supreme Court's decision in
Sedima, critics of RICO have begun to complain that the federal statute's
scope, with regard to mail or wire fraud, should be narrowed by Congress
because the statute wrongly engulfs and federalizes garden-variety state fraud
cases. The Mail and Wire Fraud Acts when used as predicate offenses do
federalize many state business frauds, but unlike any other predictate offenses,
these two Acts alone are capable of implementing the goals of RICO to the
hazardous waste industry, an industry which is regulated heavily on the federal
197. See Organized Crime Links to the Waste Disposal Industry, supra note 123.
198. Id. at I. See Report Profiling Violators of Waste Law Said Not Representative of All
Illegal Acts, 17 Env't. Rep. (BNA) at 463-64 (July 7, 1986). A 1986 report which profiles
successfully prosecuted hazardous waste violators in four Northeastern states reveals that four
recent cases in New Jersey involved individuals allegedly connected with Mafia crime families.
As a result of the report, Maryland's assistant attorney general in charge of the state's Hazardous
Waste Strike Force is looking further into the possibility of organized crime involvement in
hazardous waste law violations in Maryland. The report, however, also notes that most envi-
ronmental law offenders are not traditional Mafia-types, but are businesspeople who turn to
chemical crime in order to increase profits or remain competitive. Hazardous waste law violators
thus comprise the two groups Congress wished to thwart with RICO: (1) organized crime
families; and (2) racketeers who "launder" illegal gain through legitimate business.
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level. Most of the other predicate offenses listed in RICO, such as prostitu-
tion or gambling, have nothing to do with illegal toxic waste disposal.'99
The E.P.A.'s enforcement record against toxic waste polluters who launders
illegal profits through legitimate businesses is poor.2"' A primary reason
illegal disposers are not convicted is because of insufficient public funds and
administrative time to enforce existing state and federal environmental regula-
tions. As more and more hazardous waste is churned out by society and as
the costs of legitimate disposal increase, the potential for infiltration of the
waste disposal industry by corrupt individuals or entities increases. If the
underlying societal policies for enacting RICO are to have any effect, private
citizens must be able to sue toxic waste polluters.
During the 99th Congress (1985-86), eight different bills were introduced
in order to restrict the scope of RICO, and, although no RICO reform
resulted, the bills generated considerable enthusiasm.2"' The most sweeping
reform of RICO would be to narrow the statute's breadth by deleting mail
and wire fraud from the definition of "racketeering activity" in section
1961(1) of RICO. A lot of civil RICO claims, especially those involving state
consumer frauds, are based upon mail and wire fraud. 0 2 In wishing to avoid
placing every state consumer fraud claim in federal court, Congress has a
valid reason to prevent mail and wire fraud from being predicate offenses.
However, as seen, violations of hazardous waste laws by organized crime or
legitimate businesspeople generally will support a civil RICO action only if mail
and wire fraud are permitted to be defined as "racketeering activity." If mail
or wire fraud are deleted from RICO and no other changes are made to the
statute, then RICO cannot be used by private plaintiffs to strengthen en-
199. See supra note 97.
200. See INSIDE EPA, July 18, 1986 at 15-16 (New study by the congressional Office of
Technology Assessment charges that federal monitoring of hazardous waste transportation is
"poorly coordinated and defined." The OTA observed that no thorough record of hazardous
waste movement exists, even though Congress and the E.P.A. require industries involved with
hazardous waste to document a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act "manifest." [Back-
ground Note: RCRA, in 42 U.S.C. § 6903(12) (1976), defines the term "manifest" as follows:
"the form used for identifying the quantity, composition, and the origin, routing, and desti-
nation of hazardous waste during its transportation from the point of generation to the point
of disposal, treatment, or storage." RCRA §§ 6922, 6923 and 6924 require use of a manifest
system by generators of hazardous waste, transporters of hazardous waste, and owners and
operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities.] The OTA found no
complete flow records in any E.P.A. region.)
201. See I Cong. Index (CCM) 14,301 (1985-86) (only one Senate bill, S.2907, involved
RICO reform during 1985-1986); 2 Cong. Index (CCM) 28291, 28316, 28374, 28424, 28448,
28454, 28458 (1985-86) (H2517, H2943, H3985, H4892, H5290, H5391, and H5445 were House
bills which called for RICO reform). See also Strasser, Prospects Improve in Congress for
RICO Changes, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 18, 1986, at 5, col. I. The "Enactments-Vetoes" section of
I Cong. Index 8707 (1985-86) indicates that no RICO reform bill was enacted into law during
either session of the 99th Congress.
202. See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3287 n.16 (Court cited an ABA Task Force Report which
found that of 270 civil RICO cases surveyed, 37 percent involved common-law fraud in a
business or commercial context).
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vironmental enforcement against infiltration of the waste disposal industry
by polluters wishing to launder illegal gain.
Congress can restrict the scope of RICO to prevent federalizing state
business fraud claims and still promote treble damage enforcement challenges
against toxic waste polluters and organized crime syndicates who launder
large profits made from illegal waste disposal through legitimate businesses
which they have infiltrated. First, Congress could remove the mail and wire
fraud statutes from the list of prohibited offenses in section 1961 of RICO.
Second, Congress could include as predicate offenses the two enforcement
provisions in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which
require permits for hazardous waste disposal and which prohibit false report-
ing to the E.P.A. of hazardous waste records.2"3 Under RCRA, generators,
transporters, and treaters of hazardous waste are required to maintain records
which elaborately chart the "cradle to grave" life cycle of all their hazardous
wastes.2 4 Additionally, those who treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste
must apply for and be issued permits.21 5 The enforcement provisions in RCRA
make it a crime to inaccurately furnish hazardous waste information to the
E.P.A. and to fraudulently alter any records concerning the movement of
hazardous waste.210 By allowing the enforcement provisions of RCRA to be
203. The two enforcement provisions of RCRA are found in 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), (e) (1976).
See infra note 206 where subsections (d) and (e) are cited.
204. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922, 6923 and 6924 (1976) of RCRA which outline recordkeeping
standards applicable to generators of hazardous waste, transporters of hazardous waste, and
owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. The en-
forcement sections of RCRA, see infra note 206, provide the standards of liability for violations
of §§ 6922, 6923 and 6924.
205. See 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1976) of RCRA which requires owners and operators of facilities
used for treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous waste to apply for and receive a solid
waste disposal permit. The enforcement sections of RCRA, see infra note 206, provide the
standards of liability for violations of § 6925.
206. The two enforcement provisions, which the author recommends be incorporated as
predicate offenses when mail and wire fraud are deleted from RICO are in 42 U.S.C. § 6928
(1976) of RCRA and they provide:
(d) Criminal penalties.
Any person who-
(1) knowingly transports any hazardous waste identified or listed under this
subchapter to a facility which does not have a permit under section 6925 of this
title (or section 6926 of this title in case of a State program), or pursuant to title
I of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act,
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified
or listed under this subchapter either-
(A) without having obtained a permit under section 6925 of this title (or
section 6926 of this title in the case of a State program) or pursuant to title I of
the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such
permit;
(3) knowingly makes any false material statement or representation in any
application, label, manifest, record, report, permit or other document filed, main-
tained, or used for purposes of compliance with this subchapter; or
(4) knowingly generates, stores, treats, transports, disposes of, or otherwise
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predicate offenses under RICO, Congress could streamline RICO and still
prevent polluters from infiltrating legitimate waste disposal businesses.
However, until Congress is willing to incorporate violations of the enforce-
ment provisions of RCRA into the definition of "racketeering activity" in
handles any hazardous waste (whether such activity took place before or takes
place after October 21, 1980) and who knowingly destroys, alters, or conceals
any record required to be maintained under regulations promulgated by the Ad-
ministrator under this subchapter shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of
not more than $25,000 ($50,000 in the case of a violation of paragraph (1) or
(2)) for each day of violation, or to imprisonment not to exceed one year (two
years in the case of a violation of paragraph (1) or (2)), or both. If the conviction
is for a violation committed after a first conviction of such person under this
paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine or not more than $50,000 per day of
violation, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or by both.
(e) Knowing endangerment.
Any person who knowingly transports, treats, stores, or disposes of any haz-
ardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter-
(1)(A) in violation of paragraphs (1) or (2) of subsection (d) of this section,
or
(B) having applied for a permit under section 6925 or 6926 of this title, and
knowingly either-
(i) has failed to include in his application material information required
under regulations promulgated by the Administrator, or
(ii) fails to comply with the applicable interim status regulations and stand-
ards promulgated pursuant to this subchapter,
who knows at that time that he thereby places another person in imminent danger
of death or serious bodily injury, and
(2)(A) if his conduct in the circumstances manifests an unjustified and inex-
cusable disregard for human life, or
(B) if his conduct in the circumstances manifests an extreme indifference for
human life, shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $250,000
or imprisonment for not more than 2 years, or both, except that any person who
violates paragraph (2)(B) of this subsection shall, upon conviction, be subject to
a fine of not more than $250,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years,
or both. A defendant that is an organization shall, upon conviction of violating
this subsection, be subject to a fine of not more than $1,000,000.
Section 6928(e) is further defined in § 6928(f):
(f) Special rules.
For the purposes of subsection (e) of this section-
(1) A person's state of mind is knowing with respect to-
(A) his conduct, if he is aware of the nature of his conduct;
(B) an existing circumstance, if he is aware or believes that the circumstance
exists; or
(C) a result of his conduct, if he is aware or believes that his conduct is
substantially certain to cause danger of death or serious bodily injury.
(2) In determining whether a defendant who is a natural person knew that
his conduct placed another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury-
(A) the person is responsible only for actual awareness or actual belief that
he possessed; and
(B) knowledge possessed by a person other than the defendant but not by
the defendant himself may not be attributed to the defendant;
Provided, That in proving the defendant's possession of actual knowledge, cir-
cumstantial evidence may be used, including evidence that the defendant took
affirmative steps to shield himself from relevant information ....
Section 6928(d) would be one predicate act and § 6928(e) would be another, completely separate,
predicate act.
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RICO, mail and wire fraud should remain as prohibited offenses under sec-
tion 1961.207
CONCLUSION
Private parties in hazardous waste cases encounter strong barriers to re-
covery under traditional tort theory. The common law developed to mete
out justice for immediate, individualized, and identifiable harm. Toxic injury
which is characterized by indeterminate causation and long latency periods
is a modern harm which did not exist during the development of many
common law theories of recovery. Tort principles by their narrow historical
focus are ill-equipped to address environmental problems.
Hazardous waste victims can obtain compensation for their toxic injuries
by using civil RICO against culpable polluters. The Supreme Court repeatedly
has eliminated lower court barriers which restrict the scope of the racketeering
law. As it becomes more expensive for manufacturing industries to legiti-
mately dispose of their chemical waste, the potential for illicit dumping
increases. Congressional hearings suggest that organized crime already has
infiltrated the toxic waste disposal industry. Civil RICO allows private cit-
izens to bring enforcement and compensation actions against toxic waste
polluters.
To state a civil RICO claim, a hazardous waste victim must meet two
statutory burdens. First, he must allege a violation of section 1962, the
substantive provision of RICO. Section 1962(a)-(c) makes it unlawful for
any person through a pattern of racketeering activity to directly or in-
directly invest in, acquire or maintain an interest, or participate in an enter-
prise which is engaged in interstate commerce. Second, standing to sue under
section 1964(c) must be established. To satisfy this burden, the hazardous
waste victim must allege that he was injured in his business or property by
reason of a section 1962 violation. Since RICO allows recovery by a showing of
racketeering violations, it avoids many of the difficulties inherent in the
common law and has the potential to be a major new weapon in hazardous
waste litigation.
DAVID R. McAvoy
207. When Congress first drafted RCRA, years ago, it did not provide for civil actions by
private plaintiffs for damages. Time has shown that without private prosecutors, government
agencies are unable to quell hazardous waste law violations. See supra note 199, concerning
E.P.A.'s inadequate environmental enforcement. By incorporating the enforcement sections of
RCRA into RICO, Congress could give private plaintiffs an efficient means to combat chemical
crime and still safeguard defendants from frivolous suits. If "racketeering activity" means any
act which violates the enforcement sections of RCRA, then a plaintiff will only be able to sue
for damages when he or she can establish, first, all the elements of RICO and, second, all the
elements of the enforcement sections of RCRA used as predicate offenses. In this way, defend-
ants will be protected from a deluge of strike suits which might occur if a private damages
remedy were just amended into RCRA directly.
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